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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the effects of certain real shocks on the nominal 
and real exchange rates.
The first chapter analyses the impact and long run effects of an open 
market operation when domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes. 
The nominal exchange rate overshoots its long run value. The real exchange 
rate depreciates on impact but appreciates in the long run.
The second chapter analyses the effects of monetary disinflation when the 
government budget constraint is introduced. It is shown that when a cut 
in the rate of monetary growth is accompanied by a cut in government ex­
penditure we could have a jump depreciation of the real exchange rate.
But the costs in terms of output foregone are identical to those in the 
literature.
The third chapter shows that under plausible assumptions an expansionary 
balanced budget fiscal policy leads to current account surpluses rather 
than deficits.
The fourth (and final) chapter exmaines empirically the effects of a 
foreign real interest shock on the real exchange rate for the UK.
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1INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
2I. ASSET MARKET APPROACH TO EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION
Floating exchange rates have been with us for the last 10 years. That 
decade has seen major changes in the macroeconomic theory of the open 
economy. New models have been advanced which seem to explain the reality 
better than the traditional models.
The "consensus" macro model of the open economy in the 1960s was the 
Mundell-Fleming model. Other models were usually just variants of it.
This model consisted of three key relations: (1) a goods market 
equilibrium condition, (2) a money market equilibrium condition, and 
(3) an assumption of perfect capital mobility. Often a fourth equation 
explaining either the time rate of change or reserves (under fixed rates), 
or a zero balance of payments condition determing the exchange rate for 
the flexible rate case, was present.—^
In the international macroeconomic literature of the last decade 
the first two requirements have remained albeit with modifications. But 
the third and fourth conditions mentioned above have been subjected to 
much scrutiny and amendment.
Perfect capital mobility in the sense of the models of the 1960s 
simply meant an equality of the domestic and foreign interest rates. 
Expectations and forward rate did not figure in these models. The analysis 
of the forward rate was done elsewhere but not integrated into these models
The open economy models of the last ten years, on the other hand, 
emphasize expectations and incorporate this explicitly into the interest 
arbitrage condition. Perfect capital mobility is then taken to mean 
perfect substitutability between assets and the absence of controls on free 
movement of capital internationally.
3Assets are perfect substitutes on a covered basis if the expected 
(nominal) return on domestic assets (i) is equal to the return on foreign 
assets (i*) plus the forward discount on the home currency (f).
i = i* + f (1)
This is the covered interest parity (CIP) condition. This requirement
has been shown to be empirically robust. It ignores political risks
2/(capital controls etc.). Almost all models assume this.—
There is a much stronger assumption of uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) whereby risk-neutral speculators set the forward rate equal to the 
expected future spot rate.
i * i* + X (2)
where X is the expected depreciation of the home currency. UIP has met 
with less success empirically than CIP.
Thus, the forward market and the expectations of exchange rate changes 
have been introduced in asset market equilibrium conditions. This is why 
the new models are generally referred to as the "asset market" view.
The fourth building block of the traditional model has also received 
quite a battering in the last ten years. There the exchange rate was 
determined by the requirement that the balance of payments must equal ' 
zero since the central bank was not intervening under a floating exchange 
rate regime.—^ The balance of payments was the sum of the balance on 
current account and the balance on capital account. This, in turn, implied 
that the capital account was thought of in flow terms. This accorded well
4with the facts of the 1960s when even in the advanced capitalist countries 
capital controls were the rule rather than the exception.
The asset market view, on the other hand, assumes implicitly that 
the cost of transactions in the asset markets is negligible and preferred 
portfolios can be established instantaneously subject to the agents' 
opportunity sets.— '1 In order for the zero balance of payments condition 
to hold, the surplus on the current account is simply equal to the rate 
of growth of claims on the rest of the world.
II. REAL DISTURBANCES AND THE EXCHANGE RATE
The open-economy macroeconomics literature had been concerned with the 
effects of real disturbances even before the advent of the asset market 
models; fiscal policy and tariffs being two major examples. Since the 
emphasis was on the short run, in a model with unemployed resources even 
a monetary expansion was a real disturbance.
The 1970s witnessed, from the standpoint of the advanced capitalist 
countries, unprecedented real shocks combined with high rates of 
inflation. Many models with intermediate goods (oil) were built but it 
would be fair to say that the asset market literature has concerned 
itself primarily with the monetary side.—^
This was probably due to the ascendancy of monetarist thinking and 
policy making at the beginning of that decade. In the exchange rate 
•literature, it manifested itself in the purchasing power parity (PPP)
assumption. Increased government expenditure here could do nothing but 
crowd out net exports.
This is superficially similar to the Mundell-Fleming model. There 
under a regime of floating rates, expansionary fiscal policy was powerless 
to affect the level of output because it induced an equal decline in the 
trade balance by an appreciation of the home currency. But there the 
result was achieved due to a change in relative prices.
Later authors have re-examined these results for properly specified 
models which admit the possiblity of fiscal policy giving rise to 
intermediate run dynamics (e.g. for the PPP case see Kouri [1976] and for 
the Mundell-Fleming case see Branson and Buiter [1983]).
Although the literature continues to emphasize "monetary" disturbances, 
recently increasing attention has been paid to the effect of real 
disturbances on the exchange rate. To mention but two growing fields,
(1) the effects of fiscal policy (see Chapter 3) and (2) commercial policy 
under various assumptions about wage setting (see e.g. Krugman [1981] , 
Eichengreen [1981] , Eichengreen [1983] . Also see Dornbusch and Fischer [1980] )
The approach to real disturbances has to be, by its very nature, 
piecemeal. Hence the bewildering variety of results and the lack of a 
consensus.
A real disturbance can be defined as a shock (a change in an exogenous 
variable) to the economic system which alters the values of real variables 
even when full equilibrium is re-established. This is in contrast to a 
nominal disturbance which may have transitory real effects but will leave 
all real variables unchanged in the new steady state. All nominal
- 5 ~
endogenous variables, in this case, change in the same proportion as the 
exogenous nominal variable whose value has changed.
An example of the former in standard macroeconomics would be a change 
in government expenditure. Unless 100% direct crowding out. occurs, the 
system will not go back to the old equilibrium. An example of a nominal 
shock is a step change in the money supply. If there are unemployed 
resources, this may indeed have real effects in the short run. But if the 
long run equilibrium is one of full employment then the values of all 
nominal variables would increase in the same proportion as the increase in 
money supply, leaving the values of all real variables unchanged. For this 
to happen, however, the money stock must be the only exogenous nominal 
variable. If there are two exogenous nominal variables and the quantity 
of one of them is changed (thus changing their relative magnitudes) then 
the new steady state would not be characterised by unchanged values of 
the endogenous real variables. This would be true even if the real 
variables are homogenous of degree zero in all nominal variables. Here 
we would have homogeneity but not neutrality.
- 6 -
III. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
In the first three chapters we look at the effects of specific real 
disturbances on the nominal and real exchange rate in the context of three 
popular models. The fourth chapter derives a semi-reduced form for the real 
exchange rate and estimates it for the U.K.
In the first chapter we examine the effects of an open market operation 
in a model with three assets which are imperfect substitutes for one another. 
Two of these are exogenous and are denominated in nominal units. The 
nominal exchange rate overshoots its long run value. This is in contrast 
to the result obtained by Turnovsky [1981a]. The difference is that he 
imposed purchasing power parity and we do not. The authorities can get rid 
of this overshooting by announcing the open market operation sufficiently 
in advance. The real exchange rate, on the other hand, jump depreciates 
although the new long run equilibrium requires an appreciation. This 
"perverse" overshooting cannot be eliminated by the authorities no matter 
how long the period between announcement and implementation.
The second chapter considers the effect of a reduction in the rate of 
growth of the money supply on the real exchange rate and output. Two cases 
cure examined: the first when the reduction in monetary growth is accompanied 
by an endogenous increase in taxes to keep the budget balanced. Here the 
real exchange jump appreciates and then depreciates along the adjustment 
path back to an unchanged long run value. Output falls on impact and then 
gradually goes back to its "natural" level. This is the case analysed by 
Buiter and Miller [1981], Turnovsky [1981] and Liviatan [1980]. The second 
case we consider is when government purchase of goods and services adjusts 
endogenously to maintain a balanced budget following the introduction of the 
policy of monetary disinflation. In the new long run equilibrium the real 
exchange rate is higher (a real depreciation). The impact effect is 
ambiguous and depends on parameter values. The transition path is one where 
output is below its natural rate. So here in addition to short run costs 
(loss of output) monetary disinflation has long run costs as well, viz. 
a worsening of the terms of trade.
- 7 -
8In the third model we examine the effects of a balanced-budget 
increase in government expenditure directed towards home goods. Contrary 
to the popular Mundell-Fleming result, our model generates current account 
surpluses along the adjustment path.
In the final chapter we look at the effect of changes in the foreign 
real interest rate on the real exchange rate. First, a theoretical model 
is presented with wealth effects in the money demand and consumption 
functions and sticky prices. Wealth effects in the demand for money have 
been used to explain the twin mystery of "missing money" and "multiplying 
marks" (Frankel [1982] ). The real exchange rate depends on the current 
values of the other state variables and on the {expected) foreign real 
interest rate from now to infinity, a la Blanchard and Kahn. We use Koyck 
transforms to generate two alternative but more tractable expressions. 
These equations are then estimated with (non-linear) restrictions imposed 
on the parameters. They track the actual performance of the real exchange 
rate quite well.
Each of the chapters is self-contained and discusses the assumptions 
made in detail. All the models below belong to the class which it has 
become fashionable to refer to as ad-hoc macro models, i.e. they do not 
start off from individuals' maximizing behaviour.
In all the models below five potentially interesting features are
missing.
9First, the supply side of the economy is not modelled at all.
Output is either assumed to be at its (exogenous) full—employment value 
or is demand-determined. Some discussion of this issue is undertaken 
where relevant.
Second, the Marshall-Lerner condition is assumed to be satisfied 
always. A potentially rich exercise involving J-curves is thereby
excluded. The Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect is also assumed away.
6/Recently, there has been growing interest in this topicr- VJe just follow 
the traditional open economy macro literature and do not discuss this 
at all.
Third, real capital formation is ignored altogether. This is a 
feature of most recent models. By assuming a balanced budget and 
ignoring capital accumulation, the literature often identifies savings 
with a current account surplus. It is clear if domestic assets were 
growing at a non-zero rate then a current account surplus or deficit 
just redistributes wealth between countries.
Fourth, we ignore bond-financed government deficits. The reason 
for this is analytical tractability.
Finally, the home economy is assumed to be "small" in relation to 
the rest of the world in the sense that it takes all foreign variables ' 
as given. Foreign residents do not hold any domestic assets. The home 
country, however, is not small in the market for its good.
10
FOOTNOTES
1. See Henderson [1977]. Marston [1983] surveys the short run aspects 
of many of the models we shall be dealing with in this thesis.
2. See Eaton and Turnovsky [1983] and Girton and Henderson [1976] .
3. The Mundell-Fleming model itself visualized the exchange rate being 
determined by the interest parity condition. In this respect it is 
akin to the new models rather than its contemporaries.
4. See Girton and Henderson [1976] and Dornbusch and Branson in 
Krause and Salant [1977] . Also see Obstfeld and Stockman [1983] 
for an excellent survey of asset market models, and stock-flow 
interaction with rational expectations.
5. As a good example see the almost total exclusion of real factors 
from formal models in Shafer and Loopesko [1983].
6 . See e.g. Obstfeld [1982] and Svensson and Razin [1983],
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CHAPTER I
MONETARY POLICY IN A NON-NEUTRAL PERFECT
FORESIGHT MODEL UNDER FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES
12
1. Introduction
The recent literature on flexible exchange rate has been, to a 
large measure, concerned with the issue of "overshooting" of the 
exchange rate when agents possess rational expectations. The exchange 
rate is viewed as an asset price which responds to current and 
expected changes in exogenous variables. This "forward-looking” view 
of the exchange rate stands in sharp contrast to the view that the 
exchange rate moves to ensure a balance in the current account.
Overshooting occurs when the impact effect on the exchange rate of 
a change in an exogenous variable is greater than the long run effect. 
For example, overshooting occurs if a change in the level of the money 
stock depreciates the long run exchange rate by k% but on impact the 
exchange rate depreciates by more than k%.
In perfect foresight models,, if the exchange rate overshoots its 
long run value at all, it does so because there is some variable which 
is predetermined when the exogenous shock occurs. Thus the burden of 
adjustment in the short run falls on the non-predetermined variables, 
including the exchange rate. Over time, however, the predetermined 
variables are free to adjust and thus relieve the pressure on the 
exchange rate.
The predetermined variable which causes the exchange rate to 
overshoot when agents possess perfect foresight differs between models.
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In one class of models, the price of domestic output: adjusts sluggishly.
So following an exogenous shock the exchange rate bears the major
burden of adjustment in the short run. In the other class of models,
the predetermined variable is the stock of foreign currency denominated
asset. Foreign assets may only be accumulated by running current
account surpluses because these assets are the only traded ones. If an
exogenous change requires the real value of these foreign assets to
rise, then the real exchange rate has to depreciate because in the short
2run the total quantity of foreign currency denominated assets is fixed.
The model presented below belongs .to the latter class of
models - the so-called portfolio balance models. However, it differs
from other models in some crucial respects. First, there are three assets
in the portfolios of domestic wealth holders .which are viewed as imperfect
3
substitutes for one another. Second, almost all the models which 
discuss the issue of overshooting are models in which long run neutrality 
prevails. A step change in the money supply would change all nominal 
variables in the same proportion. in the long run and thus leave all 
real variables unchanged. Our model, however, has two exogenous assets 
denominated in nominal units and an operation that changes the proportions 
in which these assets are available to wealth holders has real effects 
even in the long run. It is important .to note that this non-neutrality 
does not arise from "money illusion" since the real variables in the 
model are homogeneous of degree zero in all nominal variables.
Actually, our model is very "classical" in all other respects except 
that there are two exogenous nominal assets.
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In this setting, an expansionary open market operation causes the 
nominal exchange rate to overshoot its long run equilibrium value. 4 Both 
the long run and the short run value of the nominal exchange rate 
increase if the interest service account is "small". The real exchange 
rate also overshoots its long run value, if the interest service account 
is small, but this overshooting is in the "wrong" direction. The long 
run value of the real exchange rate appreciates in response to the 
monetary expansion, while on impact its jump depreciates.
The implication of this is that when we look at real changes, it is 
no longer true that under perfect foresight, the impact effect of an 
exogenous shock is necessarily in the same direction as the long run 
effect . 4 And changes in money supply (whether in its level or its rate 
of growth) in most cases are real shocks if the government budget 
constraint and the central bank balance-sheets are modelled carefully.
In the second section we set out the model and its long run 
properties. The next two examine the behaviour of the nominal exchange 
rate and the real exchange rate respectively, following an increase in 
the money supply through an expansionary open market operation. The 
fifth section briefly examines the case where these changes are 
preannounced. Finally, the sixth section analyses the conclusions that
emerge.
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2. The Model
The model used is an extension of Branson's model of the asset 
markets, see Branson (1977). or Branson, at . al . (1977) • It includes a 
goods market and it enables us to study the stock-flow interaction 
following an asset market intervention. This aspect was, a t  best, 
sketchy in the Branson papers.
We make the following five simplifying assumptions. First, domestic 
output is at its unique full employment level due to wage price 
flexibility . 5 Second, all capital gains are saved. Third, the private 
sector's expenditure does not depend on thé real (domestic) rate of 
interest. Fourth, the Government always balances its budget. Finally, 
the domestic economy is assumed to be in a net creditor position vis-a-vis 
the rest of the world.
The first four assumptions help us to reduce the dynamics of the 
model to two differential equations. Otherwise more differential 
equations in the price of domestic output, money stock or the stock of 
bonds would have to be added. The fifth assumption, while not crucial 
to the results obtained in this paper, helps us get around the ambiguities 
which would surround the signs of various wealth effects, otherwise . 6
The economy produces a good which is different from the one 
produced by the rest of the world. The home economy is large enough to 
determine the price of the domestic good and the interest rate on the
16
domestic bond. It takes the foreign interest rate and the foreign 
currency price of its importable as given. The foreign rate of inflation 
is assiomed to be zero.
The model is set out in the following equations.
(j)d' = m(i, i* + x, qy/P, W) (1)
%
ml < 0 m2 < 0
o < —  . ir- < 1 0 < m < 1m P - 4
b. (i, i* + x, qy/P, W) (2)
bl > 0 b 2 < 0 b 3 < O 1 > b4 > 0
eF d(__ ) = f(i( i* + x, qy/P, W) .. (3)
fx < 0 f2 > 0 f3 < ° 1 > f4 > O
< r
P = P (q, ep*) (4)
M + B + eFW = P (5)
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= De 
e
m1 + b1 + f = o
m2 + b2 + f 2 = °  
m3 + b3 + f3 - 0 
m4 + b4 + f4 = 1
B = M
B - B B
M = P.m( )
B * P. b( )
qy/P = A (qy/P + iB/P - t + i*eF/P,
O < A 1 < 1 * 2 < 0
M - W) + G + T(A,eP*/q) 
-1 < Tx < 0 T2 > o
W = kq£ 
P
y = y
eDF/P « T (A, eP*/q) + i*eF/P
(7(a))
(7(b))
(7(c))
(7(d))
(8)
(9)
( 10 )
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(6 )
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where M = 
B =
P = 
i = 
i* = 
ë =
x =
nominal stock of domestic money
domestic bonds denominated in domestic currency ~
available to wealth holders
the consumer price index
the domestic nominal interest rate
the foreign interest rate (nominal and real)
the exchange rate, the domestic currency price of
foreign exchange
the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic 
currency
De
e
q = 
y = 
y = 
w = 
p* =
G =
t
W
the actual rate of depreciation of the domestic 
currency
domestic currency price of domestic output
the level of output
the full employment level of output
real (financial). wealth of domestic wealth holders
foreign currency price of the foreign output
the central banks holdings of domestic securities
total domestic bonds in existence
government expenditure on goods and services, assumed 
to be denominated in units of the consumption basket 
lump-sum taxes denominated in units of consumption 
target level of wealth.
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For any variable X, X^ denotes the partial derivative with 
respect to its ith argument.
Also DX = , the derivative of X with respect to time,at
Equations (1) , (2) and (3) are the demand functions for the 
three assets.
The first two arguments in the money demand function 
(equation (1 ) ) relate to the opportunity costs of holding money rather 
than alternative assets. The nominal return on money is fixed at zero 
and on domestic bonds it is i. The expected return on the foreign bond 
is the foreign rate of interest i*, plus the expected rate of 
depreciation of the domestic currency. The assumption of perfect 
foresight, equation (6) , implies that except when new information is 
received the expected and actual rates of depreciation are equal. The 
third argument is intended to be a proxy for the transactions demand for 
money. While output (y) is always assumed to be at its full employment 
level (y) (equation (15)), its real real value in terms of the 
consumption basket is free to vary. There is considerable disagreement 
on the appropriate choice of the transactions variable and our choice is 
no more arbitrary than most in the literature. We assume economies of 
scale in the use of transactions balances and, therefore, the elasticity 
of demand for such balances is less than unity. The demand for real 
balances is assumed to depend non-negatively on real wealth.
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The demand for the other two assets (equations (2) and (3)) 
depend positively on own returns and negatively on gross returns (ie, 
the assets are gross substitutes). When there is an increase in the 
transactions demand for money, the demand for at least one type of bonds 
must fall. The demand for both bonds depend positively on wealth.
Notice that all real variables are expressed in terms of the consumption 
basket and deflated by the CPI defined in equation (4).
The price index is homogeneous of degree one in prices of the 
domestic good and the domestic currency price of importables. We refrain 
from writing the price index in Cobb-Douglas form because with real 
disturbances, the shares of domestic and foreign outputs are not constant 
even in the long run.
Equation (5) is the definition of real wealth c»f domestic 
residents and equals the real value of their holdings of; the three assets.
Equation (6) is the assumption of perfect foresight.
Equations (7a) to (7d) give the "adding-up" or '"balance-sheet" 
constraints that equations (1) to (3) must satisfy. Further the positive 
partial derivative in equations (7a) to (7c) is assumed to be greater 
than either of the other two, in absolute value. In view of equation (7) 
only two of the asset demand functions are independent a-n^  one of them 
can be dropped.
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Equation (8) is the central bank's balance sheet. The supply of 
high powered money is equal to the central banks holdings of private 
security. This equation assumes away a fractional reserve banking 
system and any holdings of any foreign securities by the central bank.
Equation C9) states that the total bonds available to domestic 
wealthholders is the total value of bonds in existence less the central 
bank's holdings of these.
Equations (10) and (11) are the asset market equilibrium conditions.
When the nominal supplies of money and domestic bonds equal the nominal 
demand for them, all three asset markets clear. We need not, therefore, write 
down the equilibrium condition for the foreign asset market explicitly.
As mentioned above, we assume that the government continuously 
balances its budget. This is given by equation (12) . Its expenditure 
consists of interest payment on the bonds held by the public and on 
currently produced domestic goods and services. For simplicity we assume 
that this demand is specified in units of the consumption basket. This 
simplifies the analysis but does not change any result. The government 
(including the central bank) holds no foreign bonds and thus receives no 
interest on them. The budget is balanced by changing the level of lump 
sum taxes. All taxes are lump-sum.
The market for domestic output clears when the demand for it equals
22
its supply (equation (13)1. Four points should be noted about this 
equation. First, although output is aluays at its full employment . 
level (equation 15), the real value of output changes whenever the terms 
of trade change . 7 Second all capital gains are assumed to be saved 
and thus do not figure in the equation. Capital gains arise either due 
to changes in the price level C f ' "  1 or due to exchange rate changes 
(De.F) . Third absorption does not depend on interest rates. Finally, 
the wealth effect is expressed in terms of the gap between current 
wealth and the desired value (given by equation (14)) . If the wealth
. effect term takes this form then in the long run equilibrium there are no
8wealth effects.
The absorption function in equation (13) is capable of generating a 
stock-adjustment type savings function, so popular in the literature, 
where the coefficient of adjustment depends on the disposable income but 
not on the real rate of interest.
The total expenditure by domestic residents is determined by their 
disposable income and the gap between target and actual wealth. Disposable 
real income is the real value of output plus the real value o f  interest 
receipts on the two types of bonds minus taxes. We have not shown capital 
gains because these are assumed to be saved.
The trade balance depends negatively on the total expenditure by 
the private sector (since the government does not demand any foreign 
output) , and positively on the relative price of domestic output (eP*/q) . 
The Marshall-Lerner condition is assumed to be satisfied at all ttnles.
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Equation (14) defines desired wealth, which is a multiple of real 
value of current labour income, in accordance with life cycle principles.
Equation (15) states that output is always at its full employment 
level.
Finally equation (.16) gives the increase in the domestic residents 
claims on the rest of the world - the current account surplus. This is 
equal to the trade balance plus the interest service account (all in 
real terms).
For later derivations it is convenient to rewrite (1) and (2) 
using (10). and (1 1 ) as follows
M = P.m(i, i* + De/e, qy/PW)W (17)
B = P.b(i, i* + De/e, qy/PW)W (18)
This follows from the homogeneity of degree one of m and b in W.
We also substitute equations (5), (12), (14) and (15) into (13) to
get
qy/P = A(qy/P + i*eF/P - G, kqy/P - --+|+ )
+ G + T(A, eP*)
g
(1 9 )
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For a given state of expectations (17), (18) and (19) would 
determine the values of the endogenous variables i, q and e, given the 
exogenous variables and F. Over time the dynamics would be (determined 
by the current account and any revisions in the expectations.. But in 
our model agents are endowed with perfect foresight and therefore we 
cannot take the expectation of a change in the exchange rate as given.
This depends on the entire future time path of the exogenous variables 
from now to infinity. We first turn to the long run solution of the 
model.
Long Run Equilibrium
Since there are two exogenous variables expressed in nominal units, 
namely M and B, the model does not exhibit neutrality in the long run.
This in no way implies money illusion. A doubling of the money stock 
would raise prices by a proportion less than two because a doubling of 
the price level would lower real wealth. Non-neutrality implies not 
money illusion but simply that the value of the real variables is not 
independent of the composition of the nominal exogenous variables. Hence 
a nominal shock is a real shock as well.
In the long run equilibrium, which is a stationary state, we must 
have De = DF = 0.
The four endogenous variables are e, F, i and q, and forar equilibrium
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conditions can be derived from equations (16) , (17), (18) and (19), 
using (14) . Later we consider what happens to the real exchange rate
M = m(i, i*, —)kqy (20)k
B = b(i, i*, £-)kqy (2U
kqÿ = M + B + eF (22)
T(A, eP*/q) + i*eF/P = 0 (23)
(A bar over a variable denotes its long run value).
Note that (22), (23), (12) and (13) imply that the entire disposable 
income is being consumed in the long run equilibrium.
Long Run Comparative Statics
We are primarily interested in the effects of an expansionary 
open-market operation by the central bank. Before we analyse the long 
run effects of such an intervention, it would be useful to look at some 
of the other long-run comparative-static results.
First, equations (.20) and (21) determine the long run values 6f i 
and q. This is due to the equality of desired and actual wealth in the 
long-run and the way we have specified target wealth. Given the value
of q from these two equations we determine e and F jointly from 
equations (22) and (23) . Second, as in Branson's model cannot iQl*
be signed - the sign depends on whether domestic money is a better
substitute for foreign bonds than -domestic bonds. If the two bonds
are closer substitutes then i rises. Finally, even though the exchange
rate enters multiplicatively with the foreign price level or the stock of
foreign assets everywhere, an increase in P* is not offset by an
appreciation of the exchange rate. If a complete offset was provided
then the current account would go into deficit because the interest service
account would now be smaller. To prevent this from happening the stock
of foreign assets must rise. Thus, the model does not generate what
could be considered the minimum insulation requirement of a system of
flexible exchange rates - that it insulate the domestic economy from a
once-and-for-all change in the foreign price level. This would be true
even if the model was neutral as long as the foreign bond is not
9denominated in terms of the foreign output.
Before turning to the long-run consequences of an expansionary open 
market operation, it should be mentioned that the interest service 
account complicates the analysis considerably. In what follows, wherever 
there are ambiguities, we shall assume that this term is "small".
* »
Following an open market operation dM = -dB or mM * -bB (where a (*) 
denotes percentage change), the interest rate falls and the price of
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domestic output rises in the new long-run equilibrium. The Interest 
rate fall eliminates both the excess supply of money and the excess 
demand for bonds. The rise in the price of domestic output creates 
excess demand for both assets (via increased nominal wealth). These 
effects are given by equations (24) and (25)
==; = (b+m)/PW(m ,b-b,m) (24)dM 1 1
^  = f 1/PW (m b^-bjin) (25)
The domestic currency value of foreign asset rises as is evident 
from equation (22). On the left hand side q rises, so on the right hand 
side eF must rise by the same proportion since the sum M + B is unchanged. 
The stock of foreign bonds rises if the interest service account is 
small (equation 26)
A
~  = 7"(PWf. (M + B) (-T qye_/P + (14T.) i*eFe, /P + T„eP*/q) (26)aM ' A 1 l i x l 2
2where h = [- - (1-HT^ ) + T^eP*^] . eFPW (m^b - b^m)
and is the elasticity of the price index with respect to its ith
argument (i = q, eP*).
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The denominator in equation (26) is ambiguous in sign but would be 
negative for reasonable value of i* and (the share of the foreign* 
good in the price index). If we assume this, then the stock of foreign 
bonds rises in the new long run equilibrium.
The interpretation of this result is as follows: a fall in the 
domestic interest rate and a rise in the price level raises the demand 
for (the domestic currency value of) foreign bonds. This could be 
achieved either by an exchange rate depreciation or an increase in F.
The exchange rate and the stock of foreign bonds enter multiplicatively 
everywhere except in the price index and the relative price term. The 
term in the denominator, which is ambiguous in sign, is the difference 
between the current account effects of an increase in e and of an increase 
in F. The increase in F has no effect on the long run trade balance but 
has a larger effect than the exchange rate on the interest service account, 
because the exchange rate also enters the price index.
The effect of an open market operation on the nominal exchange rate 
is also ambiguous. This is given by equation (27) . There is now an 
ambiguity in the numerator as well. For small i*, we can still assume 
that the term inside the square brackets in the numerator is positive. So 
an expansionary open market operation depreciates the nominal exchange rate.
e_ = Il - (1+T )(M+B)i*/PD]f /W(m b-b m) (27)
dM 1 i l l
where D = [-Tjqye^P - (1+T^ i*eFe2/P + T2ep*/q]
assumed positive above.
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We finally wish to know the impact on the real exchange rate (c) .
We define it as (e/P). Others prefer to write the
real exchange rate as (.e/q) . Our definition of c makes the algebra less 
messy and it is positively related to (e/q).
The real exchange rate definitely appreciates if A is < O as is 
shown in equation (28)
- - (1+T ) i*cF. (M + B)kyf (28)dM _____ 1 1
A
So if the interest service account is not very large, an expansionary 
open market operation raises q, e and F and lowers i and c(= e/P).
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3. Dynamics of the Nominal Exchange Rate
To analyse the motion of our economy over time it is convenient to 
reduce the system of equations (.16) to (19) to two differential equations 
in terms of the state variables e and F. Since both e and F are positive 
(the latter by assumption) we shall work With the logarithms of these 
variables•-
We can solve equations (17), (18) and (19) for i, q and Dine in 
terms of e and F. In addition to the assumptions made so far we also 
assume that a depreciation creates an excess demand in the domestic goods 
market. A depreciation by raising the price level reduces the value of 
the output in terms of the consumption basket. It also diverts domestic 
and foreign demand away from the foreign good towards the domestic good, 
raises the interest income from foreign bonds and raises the domestic 
currency value of foreign bonds. All these tend to increase the demand 
for domestic output. But an increase in the price level also lowers the 
real value of M + B-. We have thus assumed that this effect is smaller 
than the excess demand creating effects. Note that this assumption is 
not required if f > e .
Given this additional assumption we have the first differential 
equation
Dine = ij>(lne, InFj M, B) (29)
^1 > 0 ^2 > °
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(30) are given in the Appendix)..
By substituting the solution of q = q(e, F) into equation (16) 
we have the other differential equation
Note that M and B feed through separately (through the asset 
market equilibrium conditions) into equation (29) but enter as a sum in 
equation (30) (through wealth effects only).
Intuitively, an increase in F tends to improve the current account via 
the interest service account, but worsen it due to increased expenditure, 
part of which falls on importables, resulting from increased wealth.
The net effect is indeterminate.
Linearising the system of differential equations (29) and (30) 
around the long run equilibrium where Dine *» DlnF = O, we have,
DlnF *= ir(lne, InF; M + B) (30)
 ^> O
While ir is positive, it is not possible to sign tr unambiguously.
(31)
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Given the signs of the elements of the matrix of coefficients, the 
Dine = o curve must always be downward sloping in the (InF, lne) 
space.
The DlnF = 0 schedule could be either upward or downward sloping.
If this schedule is upward sloping (figure 1 ) or downward sloping but 
flatter than the Dine = 0 schedule (figure 2) , the long run equilibrium 
defined by the intersection of these two schedules is a saddle point.
The arrows show the direction of motion of the variables and are 
obtained from equation (31) . The stable arm in both the cases is downward 
sloping and flatter than Dine « 0. The unstable arm is positively 
sloped (and in figure 1, steeper than DlnF * 0 locus).
Finally if the DlnF = 0 locus is negatively sloped but steeper 
than the Dine = 0 curve, then the long run equilibrium is completely 
unstable. The economy cannot reach this equilibrium unless it happens 
to start there. We shall assume that the interest service account is 
small enough and rule out this last case .(.shown in figure 3) .
Returning to figures 1 and 2, we see that only if the economy is 
on the saddle path will it reach the long run equilibrium. All other 
perfect foresight paths simply do not converge. We shall assume-that 
the economy is always on the stable manifold. This is ensured by an 
appropriate jump in the exchange rate, whenever the system is subjected 
to a shock. The stock of foreign bonds is given at a point in time and
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can be accumulated at a finite rate only by running current account 
surpluses. In assuming long run perfect foresight we invoke the 
transversality condition of optimising models without a rigorous 
justification (see Brock (1974), (1975)).
Now imagine a central bank intervention in the asset market 
involving a swap of domestic bonds for domestic money. Under the 
assumptions of the previous sections this leads to a higher steady state 
value of both lne and InF. In figure 4, therefore, we have the new 
long run equilibrium lying to the north-east of the old one e q .
If the economy is to converge to the new long run equilibrium, then 
agents must choose that value of e which puts them at point E ^  
so that following the shock the economy is on the stable ana of the new 
equilibrium. The jump must occur at the moment the unanticipated 
purchase of bonds takes place since a jump in the exchange rate implies 
an infinitely large return on foreign bonds. If a jump was to take place 
at a future date then agents with perfect foresight would move now to 
eliminate these profitable opportunities in the future.
The new long run equilibrium is the intersection of the new 
Dine « 0 schedule, which lies above the old schedule and the DlnF * o 
schedule which does not shift. This is because DlnF » 0 schedule 
unlike Dine * 0 curve, depends not on the composition of M  and B but
just their sum.
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So the nominal exchange rate overshoots its long run equilibrium 
value following the open market operation. The instantaneous effect 
on the other endogenous variables is as follows: q rises. Dine is 
negative and the effect on i is uncertain (depends on, among other 
things, whether money or domestic bonds are better substitutes for 
foreign bonds).
£
As the economy moves from EQl to E^, the exchange rate appreciates 
and the stock of foreign bonds rises, through current account surpluses. 
The adjustment is monotonic since the roots of the matrix of coefficients 
of the differential equation are real. If the equilibrium is a 
saddlepoint then the determinant of matrix A in equation (31) is negative.
Also note that the overshooting of the exchange rate is less with 
perfect foresight than if agents possessed static expectations. The 
adjustment path then would be along the Dine' = 0 schedule and the 
momentary equilibrium value of the nominal exchange rate would be at
CE . , following the shock.
01
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4. Dynamics of the Real Exchange Rate
In order to examine the dynamics of c(e/P) the real exchange 
rate, it is convenient to rewrite equations (16) to (19) with the 
wealth identity as
|  - m(i, i* + Dine, i}~ Z )W (32)
B
P = b(i, i* + Dine, h(£lZ)Mw (33)
M + B . „W = — -—  + cF (34)
h(c)y * A(h(c)y + i*cF - G, kh(c)y - W) + G + T(A, g(c)P*) (35)
cDF = T(A, g (c)P*) + i*cF (36)
where h(c) = q/P, h' < 0
and g(c) = e/q, g' > 0 .
We can solve equation (35) for W in terms of Inc and InF alone 
given M + B.
W * j(Inc, InF) 3X < 0 / 32 < 0 (37)
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The signs of and follow since either an increase in c or F 
creates an excess demand in the domestic goods market and therefore 
requires a decline in wealth to eliminate it. Substituting equation 
(37) into (36) we get
DlnF = <j> (InC, InF; M + B) (38)
<J>1 > ° $2 > 0
Note that <J>2 is unambiguously positive and equal to i* and
<j> T.yh'c + i*cF (1+T, ) + T0cP*g* )_ = l x
Cp(l+T^)
To get the other differential equation for Dine, we first solve for 
i and P from equations (32) and (34) and use (37) . Substituting in 
equation (33) we get an equation for Dine as a function of Inc and InF
Dine = £(lnc, InF; M, B) (39)
To get a value for Dine, we differentiate equation C34) with (37) 
substituted in to get,
DlnP * y (Dine» DlnF; M + B)
Subtracting (40) from (39) we get an expression for Dine.
Dine » 6 (Ino, InF; M, B) (41)
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Unfortunately, 61 and $2 are very messy and there is no hope of 
signing them.
Linearising equations (38) and (41) around the long run equilibrium 
where Dine = DlnF = 0 we have
— -
{ 1 «2 Inc - Inc
* 1 *2 InF - InF
*■
(42)
What can be said about the properties of the system represented 
by equation (42)? First, from equation (38), DlnF = 0 locus is 
downward sloping in the (F, c) plane in figure 5. The slope of this 
curve gets flatter as the foreign interest rate gets smaller. In the 
limiting case where F is foreign currency, or the interest service 
account is ignored, the DlnF 0 locus is horizontal.
Second, the Dine * 0 locus must be downward sloping. This is 
because we know from the previous section that with static expectations 
the exchange rate depreciates on impact following an open market 
operation. The price of domestic output (q) must also rise to maintain 
goods market equilibrium, with F fixed. But an equiproportionate 
increase in e and q creates excess supply in the goods market because 
e and q enter symmetrically everywhere except in the term (M + B)/P 
where increases in either lower the real value domestic assets and 
thus create an excess supply of domestic goods. So on impact
40 -
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e > q or (P) and c > 0. So the new short run equilibrium lies vertically 
above the old one (on the new Dine = 0 locus).
With perfect foresight, the initial jump in e is smaller, and 
therefore the jump in q is also smaller. Thus the impact effect on c 
is also smaller. So the stable arm must be flatter than the Dine *= O 
locus but steeper than the DlnF = 0 locus. The unstable arm is upward 
sloping.
Now consider the effects of an expansionary open market operation.
We know that in the long run, given our assumptions about parameter values, 
the stock of foreign bonds increases and the real exchange rate 
appreciates because with a higher stock of foreign bonds and an unchanged 
real exchange rate the current account would move into surplus.^ The 
real exchange rate appreciation brings about current account balance.
So it is the interest service account which causes the real exchange rate 
to appreciate. In currency substitution models, e.g. Calvo and Rodriguez 
(1977), the current account balance schedule is horizontal and the long 
run real exchange rate is determined exclusively by the trade balance.
In figure 6 , the original long run equilibrium was at EQ and the
new long run equilibrium is at E^, Both lie on the DlnF ■ 0 schedule.
This schedule does not shift as it depends on M + B and not the composition
of that sum. The Dine * 0 line moves to the right to intersect the
DlnF * 0 at The new stable arm is S'S'. In order to get to the
long run equilibrium E^, rational agents must put the economy at point 
RE The impact effect of the real exchange rate is a depreciation,
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while the long run effect is an appreciation. So even with rational 
expectations, the long run and short run effects on an endogenous ~ 
variable of a shock need not be in the same direction. Kouri's (1976) 
claim that it must be so is therefore not applicable to non-neutral 
disturbances. Thus the exchange rate overshoots but in the wrong 
direction. We dub this - "perverse overshooting".
pFor E^, the real exchange rate appreciates monotonically to the 
new equilibrium as foreign assets are accumulated by the economy 
•running current account surpluses.
It is worth mentioning that Obstfeld (1980) had got similar 
results for the fixed exchange rate case. The variable that jumped 
in the "wrong" direction there was the price of domestic output. The 
perverse overshooting in his model was also due to the interest 
service account.
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5. Anticipated Future Shocks
Let us briefly consider the following question: can an announcement 
now (at time zero) that a certain increase in M through an open market 
operation is going to be implemented in the future (on date *T) reduce 
the extent of overshooting? In particular, can we get rid of perverse 
overshooting. The answer to the first question, as we shall see, is in 
the affirmative, but it is not possible to get rid of perverse 
overshooting altogether.
Three points should be kept in mind. First, any jump in e or C 
must occur when the news of a policy change first arrive, ie, jumps 
are associated with unanticipated "news". Arbitrage rules out any 
future jumps. If jumps were allowed for t / 0, this would imply 
opportunities of profits which rational agents in our model were 
ignoring. Second, between 0 and T, the dynamics of the system is defined 
with reference to the old long run equilibrium because the policy has 
not been implemented yet. . And finally, from t = T onwards the dynamics 
is defined with reference to the new long run equilibrium, and the system 
is on the stable manifold with reference to this equilibrium.
Let us first analyse the real exchange rate case, depicted in 
Figure 7. EQ is the initial long run equilibrium. SQS0 is the stable 
arm of EQ whereas UQU0 is the unstable arm. UQU0 is upward sloping.
is the stable arm of the new long run equilibrium, E^. An
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unanticipated expansionary open market operation implemented 
immediately, causes a jump in the real exchange rate to a point such 
as J. An announcement that the same asset swap is going to be implemented 
T^ periods from now leads to a jump to point A, as rational agents 
adjust their portfolios in anticipation of the policy change. From O 
to T the path followed by the economy is given by AM. The point M is 
reached on date when the policy is put into effect. There are no 
jumps in C (ie C(T~) = C(T*)), other than the initial one from EQ to A.
If the policy was to be implemented on T^ > T^, then the initial jump 
would be smaller, from E^ to L, and the path followed by the economy 
would be LN, reaching N on date T^.
But it is impossible for the authorities to avoid perverse over­
shooting altogether. The longer is the gap between announcement and 
implementation, the smaller the initial jump but an initial jump there 
must be for all finite T. Also for anticipated changes, the current 
account is in surplus but the real exchange rate is depreciating between 
A and M or L and N, whereas for an unanticipated increase in money 
supply Implemented immediately, the popular notion of a covariation of 
an appreciating real exchange rate and a current account surplus was 
maintained (see Dornbusch and Fischer (1980)).
For the nominal exchange rate the story is quite different. The 
unstable arm of the initial long run equilibrium (EQ in Figure 8) is, 
as before, upward sloping. But it must intersect the stable arm of 
the new long run equilibrium to the left of that long run equilibrium
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position, E^, since from the real exchange rate case, we know that 
the current account must be in surplus between EQ and E^.
Again, the longer the lag between announcement and implementation 
of the policy change, the less the jump in the nominal exchange rate.
J is, as before, the result of an unanticipated immediately implemented 
policy, A- when the policy is going to be implemented on T and L when 
the policy is going to be implemented onT^, J, A, L, respectively are 
the response on date zero. J, M, and N are, as before, the points on 
the stable arm of the new long run equilibrium when the policy is put 
into effect.
Four points should be noted for the nominal exchange rate case. 
First, the magnitude of the jump becomes less as the day the policy 
is to be implemented gets to be farther into the future. Second, for all 
policies to be implemented in the future, the pattern is a jump 
depreciation followed by further depreciation till the new stable arm 
is reached; from there to Ex the exchange rate appreciates. Third, 
overshooting can be eliminated if the gap between announcement and 
implementation is sufficiently long (as for . Finally, although 
overshooting can be eliminated, it is still true that the date on which 
the policy is implemented, the exchange rate is above the long run value. 
So, fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate in excess of that required 
to establish the new long run equilibrium position do still take place.
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Conclusions
In this chapter we have analysed the impact and long run effects of 
an expansionary open market operation on the real and'nominal exchange 
rate. The increase in money supply is a real shock in a model where 
neutrality does not obtain.
The main conclusions can be summarised as follows: (1) The 
nominal exchange rate overshoots its long run value following an 
unanticipated expansionary open market operation. (2) But the real 
exchange rate overshoots in the wrong direction. The long run effect 
on the real exchange rate is an appreciation, while in the short run it 
depreciates. This must happen to push the current account into 
surplus. The economy would end up with a higher stock of foreign bonds 
in the new long run equilibrium and current account surpluses are 
necessary in the adjustment process. (3) A preannounced increase in 
the money supply can prevent the overshooting of the nominal exchange 
rate, provided there is a sufficiently long gap between announcement 
and implementation. Even then, at some point the value of the nominal 
exchange rate would be in excess of the new long run value. (4) While 
the perverse overshooting in the real exchange rate can be reduced as 
the time that elapses between announcement and implementation gets 
longer, it cannot be eliminated altogether. (5) The fluctuations that 
do take place in the nominal and real exchange rates, when the policy 
is unanticipated and implemented immediately, are less with rational 
expectations than static expectations.
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The main implication of the analysis is that for a non-neutral 
shock the impact and long run effects on endogenous variables could 
be in different directions. Where this happens, the presence of 
perfect foresight and a long lead time in implementation of the 
policy may reduce the fluctuations in the variables concerned, but. 
cannot get rid of it altogether.
It is interesting to note in this context that with an identical
model but where the domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes
(i.e. purchasing power parity (PPP) holds), Tumovsky (1981a) shows
that the nominal exchange rate overshooting need not occur. In Eaton
and Turnovsky (1983a) , this result is quoted as demonstrating that with
flexible prices and imperfect asset substitutability nominal overshooting
may.not occur. Our analysis shows that these two assumptions are
not responsible for that conclusion, it is the assumption of PPP which
1 2 '.generates causes of undershooting.- -
APPENDIX
In equation (31),
i/> = eF [ZPW (-m b + b m) + (Z
PD 1 1 A2W)(m + b)qy(-m b + m b ) ,
where Z *  qye (1-A.. (1+T,) -  A k(l+T ) )  + i*eF A (1+T,)p 2 1 1  2 1 —  1 1 1
A2W 1 C1+T1) + T2ep* ,
q
and D = eF Z p2W2(m b -  m b ) > 0 sp 1 2  2 1
ip - eF[(A (1+T )eF - \  (1+T^ i*eF) PWqy ( m ^  - m ^ )  
2 PD 2 1 P P
+ Z PWeF(-m1b ( l ”n23) + b^md-iy^) ) ] ,
mwhere n1 3 * __3 q£ and n
m PW 23 = -1 SZ2 b PW '
^  « p2w2(m1b2 - m ^ )  lT1qye2/P - (1+T^ - ^eP*]
-------------■ - . P q P
2 2and tt2 * P W ( m ^  - m ^ )  iZi*eF + (A (1+T )eF - a (1+T )i*eF)
....  - ■ —— ......  P ^ T. 1 1 T "
(-<££ e ^1 + i*eF e. + T_ eP* 1
P ^ l + T ^  P . q (1+Tt)
In equation (39),
a »  _1 [-(m+b) (X -  A2Cl+T1)Wh,c) ^ b r ^  -  ^ m r ^ )  
1 A h
-  (X + A2(1+T^)W)(m^b -  mb^)] > O ,
where A = A2(l+T^ )(m+b)(®^b2 - n^b^) < 0f
and X - (1-A.^ l-f-T^ ) - A ^ U + T ^ h ' c y  - A^ (1+T^) i*cP - T ^ g ’c < 
¿ 2 « 1_ X Cm1 bn23 - b ^ i ^ )  <m+b) A1 C1+T1) i*cF + (n^b - bjin) f {-A^l+T^
+ A1 (l+T1 )i*CF)] > O
" i (mib 2 " m 2bl}CX + A 2 (1 +T1 )CF) > ° 'A
Y2 «  1 ^ 2  "  “ 2bl J (A2(1+T1ÎCF " A1U+Tl ) i *CF) > 0 A
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FOOTNOTES
1. This literature originated with Dornbusch (1976). In these 
models changes in wealth through current account imbalances are 
ignored.
2. Representative papers here are Kouri (1976) and Calvo and 
Rodriguez (1977). Henderson (1980) attempts a synthesis of 
the two approaches when price and exchange rate expectations 
are regressive.
3. On models of imperfect substitutability see Branson (1977) , 
Branson et al_ (1977) and Girton and Henderson (1976) „
4. Contrary to Kouri's claim (Kouri (1976) p.282 and p.30l) .
5. In our model the supply of labour is inelastic. If the supply 
curve was upward sloping and the supply price of labour is
the nominal wage deflated by a consumer price index, which 
includes the price of imported goods, then full employment 
output would vary in response to a change in the real 
exchange rate.
6 . See Henderson and Rogoff (1982) on this issue.
7. See Dornbusch (1980) Chapter 4 Appendix
8 . See Fischer (1981) for a discussion on the specification of 
wealth effects.
9. See e;g.,Turnovsky (1979). ..
10. This has been recognised by many authors previously eg, Rodriguez 
(1979), Branson and Buiter (1983) , Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) 
and Allen and Kenen (1980).
11. See Katseli-Papaefstratiou (1979).
12. There are other differences between Turnovsky's model and ours, 
e.g. he holds only one nominal asset exogenous, the other 
financing the budget deficit. Also, although he uses regressive 
expectations, they are incompatible with perfect foresight 
because the adjustment path is cyclical. This cannot be the case 
with one stable root.
52
CHAPTER II
FISCAL POLICY, MONETARY DISINFLATION AND
REAL EXCHANGE RATE
- 53
1. INTRODUCTION
Events in the UK and the US over the past few years seem to suggest 
that a reduction in the rate of inflation by reducing the rate of growth 
of the money stock may entail substantial costs. Theoretical models 
capable of explaining these costs, in an open economy context, have been 
proposed by Bui ter and Miller (1981, 1982) and Tumovsky (1981), among 
others. An unanticipated, immediately implemented reduction in monetary 
growth causes an immediate appreciation of the real exchange rate. This 
worsens the trade balance and creates unemployment. The jump appreciation 
of the real exchange rate can be reduced, but not eliminated, by announcing 
the implementation of the reduction in monetary growth at a future date. 
Further, the loss of competitiveness would not occur if the reduction in 
the rate of growth of money was implemented in conjunction with a rise in 
the level of the money stock.
This conclusion seems very robust in the face of "sensitivity analysis", 
as long as it is assumed that there is sluggish adjustment in the goods 
market but speculators are endowed with forward looking expectations.
The models used to derive these results are variations of Dornbusch 
(1976). That in turn was a log-linear version of the familiar Mundell-Fleming 
model with the expected depreciation of the domestic currency included in 
the interest arbitrage condition. The drawbacks of the Mundell-Fleming
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model, which the other models share, are well known. The most important 
of these is that it ignores "intrinsic (asset) dynamics" altogether. "
Thus, the long run equilibrium of the model does not necessarily imply 
either a balanced government budget or a zero current account.
Within the confines of such a model we re-examine the results obtained 
by Buiter and Miller and Turnovsky by introducing a government budget 
constraint. A reduction in the rate of growth of money, in the absence of 
residual bond financing, must be accompanied by either an increase in 
taxes or a cut in government expenditure.
The first case, where a reduction in the rate of growth of money is 
achieved by raising taxes, with government expenditure constant, generates 
the results obtained by Buiter and Miller and Turnovsky, if capital gains 
and losses on real balances are taken into account. With government 
expenditure constant, a reduction in the inflation tax necessarily implies 
an increase in explicit taxes. The long run level of the real exchange 
rate is unaffected by the monetary slowdown. In the short run the real 
exchange rate definitely overshoots its long run value.
In the second case, when monetary disinflation is accompanied by cuts 
in government expenditure on domestic goods and services, the impact 
effect on the real exchange rate depends on parameter values. Overshooting, 
undershooting and no jumps are all possible candidates. If overshooting 
occurs at all, it is in the "wrong" direction. The long run real 
exchange rate depreciates while the impact effect of a monetary slowdown 
is to generate an appreciation. In the long run, the level of domestic
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output returns to its exogenous "natural" rate and the real exchange 
rate depreciates. The natural rate of output commands fewer units 
of the consumption bundle (which includes foreign goods whose relative 
price has risen as the terms of trade move against the home country) . 
Notice that our model possibly understates the extent of the long run 
"welfare loss" because it takes the natural rate of output as exogenous. 
If it had been endogenous, and aggregate supply had been responsive 
to changes in the real exchange rate, the natural rate of unemployment 
would have risen. A given product wage rate commands fewer units of 
consumption and thus labour supply falls. This result is independent 
of the way expectations are generated.
Although in the second case (when government expenditure is cut) 
on impact the real exchange rate could go in any direction, the 
cumulative loss of output is identical to the Buiter-Miller case.
The cumulative output loss depends on the difference between the value 
of the real exchange rate following the shock and its new long run 
value. This has obvious implications for those economists in the UK, 
who have tried to show that the pound did not "overshoot" in 1979 
(see e.g., Annual Monetary Review, Centre for Banking and Finance (1980),
p. 1 2 ).
In Section 2 we set out the model. In Section 3 we examine what 
happens when a reduction in the rate of growth of money stock is 
accompanied by an increase in taxes. Section 4 examines the effects of 
cuts in government expenditure to match the monetary slowdown. Finally 
in Section 5 the conclusions are discussed.
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2. THE MODEL
The model consists of the following equations.
M/P ■ £(i, qy/P) ^  < 0, > 0 (1)
i = i- + X (2,
qy/P » A (qy/P - irM/P - qt/P, i -rr) + qG/P + T (A, eP*/q)
0 < A1 < 1 * A2 < °* “ 1 < < O, T 2 > O (3)
Dq/q = j(y-y) + V j' > 0
yM/q = G - t (5)
P - <f>(q, eP*)
X - De/e )
)
IT *= DP/P )
where M * the nominal money stock,
P « the consumer price index, 
i *  the domestic nominal rate of interest, 
q ■ » money price of domestic output, 
y » domestic output assumed to be demand determined,
i* m foreign nominal interest rate (= foreign real rate),
(6)
(7)
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e
X = 
t « 
G =
it *
A « 
T « 
p* =
Dq/q =
y = 
y -
De/e «
DP/P a
the exchange rate defined as the domestic currency price of 
foreign exchange,
the expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate,
lump sum taxes denominated in terms of domestic output,
government expenditure on domestic goods and services
denominated in domestic output,
the expected rate of change in the price level,
the private sector’s real absorption in terms of consumables,
the trade balance measured in terms of units of consumption,
the foreign currency price of the foreign good, given exogenously,
the time derivative of log q,
exogenously given natural rate of output,
the rate of growth of the money stock,
the actual rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, the 
right hand time derivative of log e, 
the rate of change of the price level.
A prime denotes a derivative, a subscript i, the ith partial 
derivative, and D the time derivative (= d/dt).
Equation (1) is the money market equilibrium condition. It requires 
the real supply of money be equal to the real demand for it. The demand 
for money depends negatively on the nominal rate of interest, which is 
the opportunity cost of holding money, and positively on the real value of 
domestic output (qy/P). To simplify later derivations, let us assume, 
without loss of generality, that the elasticity of the transactions 
demand for money is unity.
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Equation (2) is the interest arbitrage equation. Domestic and 
foreign bonds are perfect substitutes on a covered basis. Further, " 
agents are assumed to be risk-neutral, so that the forward discount 
equals the expected depreciation of the home currency. The arbitrage 
condition always holds except when new information is received.
Equation (3) is the domestic goods market equilibrium condition. 
Domestic output is demand determined. Both demand and supply of output are 
expressed in units of the consumption basket. Demand for domestic output 
’arises from three sources - the domestic private sector, the public sector 
and from abroad. Private sector demand depends on its real disposable 
income and the real interest rate. Real disposable income equals the 
real value of domestic output minus the sum of capital losses on real 
balances (the inflation tax) and lump-sum taxes. There are no wealth 
effects and capital gains or losses on other items of wealth are also 
ignored. This is done to keep the model analytically tractable by limiting 
the dynamics of the system to two differential equations.
Net foreign demand depends on domestic residents total expenditure (a 
part of which falls on the foreign good) and the relative price of the 
foreign good. The government demands only domestic goods.
Equation (4) is the expectations-augroented Phillips' curve. The rate 
of change of the price of domestic output depends on the gap between the
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current level of output (y) and the exogenous natural level (y) , and on 
the expected rate of inflation. Expected inflation, as in Bui ter and 
Miller (1981) is assumed to be its long run value, given by the rate of 
growth of the only exogenous nominal variable M. jj should be interpreted 
here as the right hand time derivative of log M. The interpretation that '• 
we would be attaching to this specification in the analysis later is that 
the price of domestic output evolves continuously and does not jump in 
response to new information. We shall also discuss the case where 
expectations of inflation are fully rational (the case discussed by Buiter 
and Miller (1982), and Turnovsky (1981)).
The government budget constraint is given by equation (5). The 
actual growth of the nominal money stock must be equal to the nominal 
value of the government budget deficit (q (G-t)). We assume that government 
changes either taxes or its expenditure to ensure a given rate of growth 
of the money supply (u) . Again we are ignoring the interest payment on 
outstanding government bonds.
Equation (6 ) is the definition of the price index. P is homogeneous 
of degree one and increasing in its two arguments q and eP*.
Equation (7) is the assumption of perfect foresight. The actual and 
expected rates of depreciation are equal. This holds everywhere except 
when new information is received. We shall permit the exchange rate to
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make a jump at those points. De then is the right hand derivative of e. 
The expected rate of inflation is equal to the actual rate of inflation. 
The latter is simply a weighted average of the rate of increase of the 
price of domestic output and the exchange depreciation, since we assume 
that the foreign rate of inflation is zero.
As noted above, we have not included interest payments on domestic 
bonds and these do. not figure in the definition of disposable income 
either. Nor does interest payments on bonds denominated in the foreign 
' currency. Wealth is not an argument in any of the equations and it is not 
even required to be constant in the long run. These are well known 
drawbacks of the Mundell-Fleming model, of which ours is a variant. ^
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3. A TAX-"FINANCED" CUT IN U
Suppose the government wishes to reduce the rate of growth of money 
supply and thereby bring down steady-state inflation. This it does by 
increasing taxes i.e., it switches from an inflation tax to explicit 
taxation. The government budget constraint can be written as
t «* G + ym. (8)
G and y are both exogenous and as m(= M/q) changes t is altered to 
ensure a balanced budget.
The long run equilibrium conditions are given below. Xn the steady 
state equilibrium, all nominal variables grow at the rate of growth of 
money supply (y), and all real variables are constant.
Denoting the long run value of an endogenous variable by a bar over 
it, and given the assumption,of unit elasticity of money demand with 
respect to the real value of output, we can write the long run equilibrium 
conditions as follows;-
m ■ L(i* + y)y _ (9J
h(c)y * A(h(c) (y - G) , i*) + h(c)G + T(A,cP*) (10)
where h(c) = q/P h' < 0
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Note that in (10) because our definition of disposable income included 
capital losses on real balances due to inflation, we can write the 
i  disposable income in terms of y and G only.
Equation (9) determines the steady-state value of m. A  fall in y, 
reduces the opportunity cost of holding money and thus raises the steady-state 
value of m (dm/dy « yL' < 0). On the other hand a fall in y does nothing 
to change competitiveness c(= e/q) (dc/dy = 0). This is because government 
expenditure on domestic goods and services is left unchanged and in the 
long run the sum of the inflation tax and explicit taxes must be equal the 
unchanged government expenditure. In other words, explicit taxes and 
inflation tax are identical in their primary burden, although in their 
secondary burden they may be different.
DYNAMICS
Because we assumed unit elasticity for the transaction balances, we 
can write equation (1 ) as
m » L(i)y d ' )
We can then substitute for i, P, X and rr from equations (2) , (6 ) and 
(7) respectively into (1’), (3) and (4). Then eliminating t, DP/P and y 
from the latter set of equations using (5) we can get
Dlnm = tj/(lnra, Inc* y)
*
Dine « 0 (lnm, Inc; y) .
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In (11) and (12) we have suppressed all other exogenous variables.
Linearising (11) and (12) around the long run equilibrium where 
Dine = Dlnm = 0 , we have
■» *•
Dlnm lnm - lnm
ss A
Dine Inc - Inc
(13)
where
where A
au " a+Tj^ ) - y n tT ^ J < 0
a12 - < O
A
a2i m (1~A^ (l+T^))y/j1 + A^ d+T^Jm] < q
a 22 - + L>) > o
A
yL' [ d**A^ (1+T^ ) )h/j ' + A^l+T^hm] + (L/j * + L')(A ct(l+T )
- (1 -a)(1+Tj))
b - [(y-G)(1-Aj(i+Tj))h'c - T^cP*] < 0 
where a = dlnP/dlnq
- 64
The signs of a ^  above are given on the assumption that A is negative.
A sufficient condition for this is that L + L'j' be positive. This is the 
condition for the LM curve to be upward sloping in the real interest 
rate-output space. When output increases, the demand for money increases 
directly by L. But an increase in output raises the rate o f  inflation by 
j' and so lowers the demand for money by L'j'. We assume the former 
effect dominates.
The determinant of A in equation (13) is negative, which is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the long run equilibrium to be a saddle-point
locally.
In figure 1, the Dine « 0 locus is upward sloping and the Dlnm * Q  
locus is downward sloping. The saddle path SS is upward sloping and 
flatter than the Dine «■ 0 locus and the unstable arm W  is downward sloping 
and steeper than the Dlnm = 0 locus.
In order for the economy to converge to the long run equilibrium, it 
must be on the stable manifold SS. All other perfect foresight paths 
diverge away from equilibrium approaching the unstable arm W  asymptotically. 
We assume that the economy is always on the saddle path. This is achieved 
by a jump in c and e. The price of domestic output q  is taken to tie pre­
determined at a point in time. So m is a predetermined variable except 
when the authorities increase the level of the money stock (M).
p U v C > o
U v m  = 0
FCjua-c i.
U v •H.
t n c
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The monetary slowdown in this case increases the long run level of 
real balances and leaves the long run real exchange rate unchanged. 'It 
is easily verified that both Dlnm - 0 and Dine - 0 curve shift to the right 
by the same distance (-yL'). The moment this unanticipated policy of 
disinflation is put into effect the real exchange rate appreciates to put 
the economy on the new stable arm at EQl in figure 2. So the real exchange 
rate overshoots its (unchanged) long run value on impact. This is the case 
analysed by Buiter and Miller (1981) and Turnovsky (1981) . Intuitively, 
real money balances have to be accumulated during the transition to the 
new long run equilibrium. So from equation (4) y must fall below its 
natural level. This fall in y is brought about by the jump appreciation
of c.
From Eq 1  
At Ex the old
the economy moves steadily to E , accumulating real balances, 
level of competitiveness is restored. A  monetary slowdown
accompanied by increased taxes therefore has real effects which are
transitory. Money is superneutral in this case. Also notice, in the new 
long run equilibrium the trade balance surplus or deficit is the same 
(not necessarily zero) as in the old long run equilibrium*
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4. REDUCTION IN y WITH ENDOGENOUS G 
LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM
Since nothing crucial hinges on it and none of the results are 
modified, in this section we shall ignore capital gains on real balances.
The long run equilibrium condition can now be written as
m ** L(i* + y )y. (14)
h (c)y - A(h (c) (y - t) ,i*) + h(c)ym + T(A,cP*) (15)
The long run equilibrium condition (14) is unchanged. A  fall in the 
rate of growth of money supply would increase the long run level of real 
balances (dm/dy = yL* < 0).
The effect of a change in y on c is given by the expression
dS/dy - . h m U  - yyL'/m)/((y(l-A^UT^) - w ) h *  - t 2?*> (16)
Consider the numerator first. It is positive if the elasticity of 
money demand with respect to the interest rate is less than unity. We 
shall assume this to be the case. There is considerable empirical evidence 
to support this assumption e.g., Goldfeld (1973) found this elasticity to
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be significantly less than unity. If, however, the elasticity were greater 
than unity then a reduction y would raise government expenditure at an 
unchanged real exchange rate, and thereby create an excess demand for
domestic goods.
The denominator in the equation above tells us the effect of a real 
exchange rate change on the demand for domestic goods. A real depreciation 
tends to create an excess demand by lowering the real value of a given level 
of output and switching domestic and foreign demand towards the domestic 
good. It also tends to create an excess supply by lowering the real value 
of a given level of government expenditure. We shall assume that the net 
effect is to create an excess demand in the domestic goods market.
A reduction in y therefore requires a real depreciation. This is 
because a fall in y raises real balances but the level of government 
expenditure falls (G - ym and ym falls). So a real depreciation is necessary 
to remove the excess supply. *■
If there are unemployed resources a real depreciation (with 
Marshall-Lerner conditions satisfied) reduces unemployment, but also reduces 
the value of domestic output in terms of the consumption basket. Usually 
(implicitly) it is assumed that the former effect outweighs the latter.
But when the terms of trade worsen in long run equilibrium, there is an 
unambiguous welfare loss. With output at its (exogenous) full-employment
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value, a real depreciation simply reduces the real purchasing power of that 
fixed output. If we had modelled the supply side of the economy, the 
natural rate of output would have been endogenous. Then the long run level 
of output would have been lowered. ■ This happens if the labour supply curve 
is upward sloping and depends on the wage rate in terms of the consumption, 
bundle, not the product wage rate. A worsening of the terms of trade would 
move the labour supply curve inwards at any given product wage rate and
reduce employment.
So there are long run costs of monetary disinflation when this is 
achieved by reducing government expenditure. Real income is reduced 
unambiguously in the long run.
DYNAMICS
Proceeding as in the previous section we can eliminate i, P, \t 
it, G, DP/P and y from equations (1) to (7). We are then left with two 
differential equations
Dlnm « x(lnm, Inc; y)
Dine «= z(lnm, Inc.* y)
where, as before, we have suppressed all exogenous variables except y.
(18)
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Linearising this pair of differential equations in the neighbourhood 
of the long run equilibrium where Dlnm = Dine = 0 ,  we have
Dlnm lnm - lnm
se B
Dine Inc - lnc_
(19)
where b ^  =
12
21
22
n
a
mfyL'yh + A a(1+T )] < 0 
D Z
£[yL'n] < 0 
D
m [-(1-A (1+T ))h/j* + (yL' + L/j')Vh] \ 0
D X A
£  [ (L/j' + yL')n] > 0  
D
-yL'(1 - A1 (l+T1) )h/j ' - A2a(l+T1) (yL* + L/j) 
[-(1 - A^ (1+T^) )yh * + pmh' + T ^ * ]  
dlnP/dlnq.
As in the last section we assume L > ,|yL'j'| so D is positive. The 
expression n is the effect of a depreciation on the commodity market. 
We assume a depreciation creates excess demand in that market.
To sign b 21 we notice that a rise in m creates an excess supply In 
the money market directly and therefore Dine tends to fall. But a rise in m
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also raises government expenditure (dG - Pdra) and this raises output 
through a multiplier process [ph/(1-A^l+T^ ) ] . And this rise in income 
has the usual effects on the money market - a rise in transactions demand 
and a decline in the asset demand. ■ The effect of m on Dine then depends 
on whether the direct excess supply creating effect is stronger than the , 
indirect effects i.e., whether 1 < (j'yl*1 + D p h /  (1- A ^ l + T ^  ). We assume
the first inequality holds so b2l < 0 .
The long run equilibrium is again a saddle-point locally (see figure 1). 
The stable arm is upward sloping and flatter than the upward sloping 
Dine - 0 schedule and the unstable arm is negatively sloped and steeper 
than Dlnm - 0 line, which is also downward sloping. We again assume that 
the economy is always on the saddle path by appropriate jumps in e and c.
A decline in the rate of monetary growth raises the steady state 
values of both m and c. The new long run equilibrium is therefore to the 
north-east of the old one. ' The Dlnm - 0 schedule shifts to the right 
(by (hm - A a ( 1+T^)/(Ph + A2ot (l+^J/yL 1)). The Dine « 0 line may shift in 
either direction. The expression for its shift is
[-yL1 - nmiyL'j’ + t)/(l - A ^ l + T ^ j l / x  where x « m - vhmCyL’j 1 ■ L) /
(1 - A ^ d + T ^ )  assumed positive above. Now the first term in the numerator 
is the excess demand in the money market if p is lowered. The second term 
is the change in money demand through the effect of p on y, if the former 
effect dominates then Dine = 0 shifts to the right.
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If the Dine = 0 schedule shifts to the left or does not shift at all 
when y is reduced then on impact the real exchange rate undershoots its 
long run value.
If the Dine ■ 0 schedule shifts to the right then three cases are 
possible. First, when the stable arm of the new long run equilibrium is 
flatter than the line joining the two long run equilibria. Second, when 
that line is flatter than the new saddle path. Finally, when the slopes 
are equal.
In the first case the real exchange rate undershoots its long run 
value and, therefore, this can be treated with Dine « o line not shifting 
or shifting to the left. We examine this case and the other two in turn.
Undershooting of c
This happens as pointed above when Dine * 0 stays put, shifts to the 
left or when it moves to the right but the stable arm of the new 
equilibrium is flatter than the line joining the old and the new long run 
equilibria. This is shown in figure 3. EQ is the original long run 
equilibrium and E x is the new long run equilibrium. When the unanticipated 
and immediately implemented policy of reducing y is put into effect, the 
real exchange rate depreciates (point EQX). This depreciation is short of 
the long run requirement. From E0 1 the economy converges monotonically to 
V  with rising c and m (because the roots of the coefficient matrix are
real)
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If the policy had been announced (say at T ) in advance of its 
implementation (at T > TQ) , then the economy would have jumped to position 
such as Eq2 below BQl in' figure 4. From E0 2 , the system would be driven 
by a path (which approaches the unstable arm UQU0 of Eq  asymptotically) 
that arrives on the convergent path ^  date T^ (point B) . The
only jump in c takes place when the policy change is announced (i.e., when 
it was unanticipated) and no jumps occur when it is implemented. Arbitrage 
would rule out such anticipated jumps since they would imply infinitely 
high real returns on bonds.
The delayed implementation means m falls initially and starts rising 
only when the policy is put into effect. The real exchange rate depreciates 
steadily.
"Perverse Overshooting” of c
When the stable arm of the new long run equilibrium is steeper than 
the line joining the two long run equilibria then we have the situation 
portrayed in figúre 5.
When the previously unanticipated policy of a reduction of monetary 
growth is put into effect, the real exchange rate appreciates to E -• on
impact. From EQl the system converges monotonically to E 
depreciating real exchange rate and rising real balances.
1 with a
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We refer to this case as "perverse overshooting" because the long 
run requirement is a depreciation of the real exchange rate and yet 
convergent (or long run) perfect foresight requires an appreciation on
impact.
The authorities can reduce the initial overshooting by announcing the 
policy before (say at TQ) its implementation (at T ^  . The economy jumps 
to a position such .as EQ2 in figure 6 . The longer the delay in implementa­
tion the smaller the initial- Jump, from EQ2, the real exchange rate 
' appreciates and the real balances are built up till date From time
T onwards (when the policy is put into effect) , the real exchange rate 
depreciates with real‘balances rising till the new long run equilibrium E x
is reached.
No Jump in c
Here the economy at EQ is on the stable manifold with reference to E 
and hence no jump in c is required (figure 7), From EQ the economy 
converges monotonically to E^.
A delayed implementation has no effect on c. 
till the policy is put into effect.
The economy stays at E__ 
0
To summarise the three cases; when we recognise the interdependence 
of monetary and fiscal policy through the government budget constraint,
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the impact effect of c can be either the one associated with contractionary 
fiscal policy in the Mundell-Fleming model (a depreciation) or that 
associated with a contractionary monetary policy (an appreciation) .
It is however important to recognise that whatever the impact effect .. 
on the real exchange rate, the output costs of disinflation are the same.
In other words, whether the exchange rate jump appreciates or depreciates, 
unemployment in this model would rise above its natural rate when a 
contractionary monetary policy is put into effect.
This is important for the UK where some commentators have attributed 
the entire appreciation of the pound in the 1979-80 period to North Sea 
Oil. These authors were trying to shield the Conservative government from 
the charge of having triggered off a recession by causing an appreciation 
of the pound through its policy of bringing down inflation. Here we have 
shown that an appreciation of the pound is not a necessary consequence of 
such a policy. And now we turn to an examination of why the output costs 
are those implied by the Bui ter and Miller model even in such a case.
The expectations-augmented Phillips curve is reproduced for convenience
Dq/q - j(y-y) + V j ' > 0 
or - Dlnm * j(y-y)
Integrating both sides of (4') we have
(4)
(4*)
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lnm(O) - lnm = /j(y(t) - y)^t (20)
0
or X(Inc(0+ ) - Inc) = /j(y(t) - y)dt (2 1 )
where X is the inverse of the slope of the stable manifold (and is positive)
Equation (20) tells us that the cumulative loss of output is 
proportional to the difference between the level of real balances when the 
policy is put into effect (at time 0) and the long run level of real 
balances. Because the roots of the system of differential equations in 
equation (14) are real therefore, y(t) is always less than y in the 
transition to the new long run equilibrium.
Equivalently we could write the output costs in terms of the real 
exchange rate. We know that the slope of the stable arm is positive i.e.,
(Inc(t) - Inc)/(lnm(t) - lnm) - 1/X. (22)
So we can express (20), by using (22), equivalently as (21) where 
c(0+ ) is the value of the real exchange after the jump.
The output costs of disinflation are very similar even 
fully rational Phillips' curve as in Turnovsky (1981). The 
can then be written as
- Dine « j(y-y)
if we had a 
Phillips curve
(23)
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and output costs can be represented by (2o) or (2 1).
What happens when the policy is preannounced? In the undershooting 
case, this is accompanied by a decline in real balances, so we have output 
above the natural rate till the policy is implemented (at date .
From Tx onwards until the new steady date is reached the level of output is 
below its natural rate. In the perverse overshooting case output starts 
falling from the time the announcement is made of the futere cut in y . 
in the no change in c case output stays at its capacity level till the 
policy is implemented and in the transition to the new steady state falls
below the natural rate.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the relationship between the real exchange rate 
(and other endogenous variables) and a slowdown in monetary growth.
Unlike the other papers where this relationship has been examined we have not 
ignored, the government budget constraint. The long run effects and the 
time path .of the endogenous variables depends on whether the reduction in 
y is achieved by increased explicit taxes or a cut in government 
expenditure. When the former method is chosen, we get the usual result of 
an overshooting of the real exchange rate. The long run of the real exchange 
rate is not influenced by a fall in y.
On the other hand, if the cut in y is accompanied by cuts in G then we 
cannot say a priori which way the exchange rate moves on impact.
But there are both steady state and short run costs of such a policy.
The short run costs occur because output falls below its capacity level when 
the policy of disinflation is put into effect. The reasoning is as in 
Buiter and Miller. The only way real balances can be accumulated (because 
higher real balances are desired in the new long run equilibrium), with a 
lower rate of growth of the nominal money stock is for the price of domestic 
output to lag behind this lower growth rate of the money stock. The only 
way the time path of prices can be lowered is by a fall in the level of 
output below its natural level.
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But there are long run costs as well. The terms of trade move against 
the home country and thus reduces the real value of the given natural rate 
of domestic output. This happens because a fall in government demand 
creates an excess supply in the domestic goods market. The excess supply 
is eliminated by a change in the real exchange rate, in a closed economy, 
there would be a channel unavailable in our model due to the assumed 
perfect substitutability of assets, through which demand could be 
stimulated - the real rate of interest.
An announcement in advance of implementation m a y  for some time increase 
the level of output above its natural level but when the policy is put 
into effect output must fall below its natural level.
The simple analytical solution to avoid these output costs is, as 
Buiter and Miller suggest, a step increase in the nominal money supply.
But that poses serious problems of political credibility.
FOOTNOTES
If interest payment on government bonds was included, we would 
have to introduce some other endogenous variable in government 
budget constraints to ensure that a y per cent growth rate of 
the nominal money stock was followed. This could be a G' 
policy of ,Tobin and Buiter (1976) or residual bond financing m  
the latter case if government bonds are denominated in nominal 
units, then in steady state they have to grow at y% also.
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CHAPTER III
A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF A TAX-FINANCED INCREASE
IN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE UNDER FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade our understanding of how an economy operates under a 
system of flexible exchange rates has undergone substantial modifications. 
Few old models have emerged unscathed. One model which has proved quite 
durable is the Mundell-Fleming model. Not that it has not had its share 
of criticism, but it continues to be the consensus open-economy macro
model.
It is well known that this model predicts the monetary policy is 
totally ineffective in affecting the level of output under a system of 
fixed rates. Similarly fiscal policy is impotent under a flexible rate 
r e g i m e . B o t h  of these extreme results have received considerable 
attention. The fixed rate result led to the "sterilisation" and "offset 
coefficient" literature. Recently the fiscal policy ineffectiveness 
under flexible rates has come under close scrutiny and has been the 
subject of considerable criticism.
The Mundell-Fleming can be reduced to a system of three equations. 
Commodity market equilibrium requires domestic output to be equal to 
the demand for it from domestic and foreign sources. Money market is in 
equilibrium when a given nominal (and real, since prices are constant) 
quantity of money equals the demand for it. Finally domestic and 
foreign interest bearing assets are considered to be perfect 
substitutes, and with static expectations, domestic and foreign interest 
rates are equal. Now an increase in (tax-financed) government expenditure 
would tend to raise output, put upward pressure on interest rates by 
raising the transactions demand for money, thereby generating incipient 
capital inflows. The capital flows appreciate the domestic exchange 
rate leading to a substitution of foreign goods for domestic output at
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home and abroad. Equilibrium is re-established when the trade balance 
is worsened by the amount by which government expenditure had increased. 
There is 100% crowding out. The model then predicts three consequences 
of an expansionary fiscal policy: (i> no change in the equilibrium 
level of output, (ii) an appreciation of the nominal (and real) exchange 
rate and (iii) a current account deficit (equal in magnitude to increased 
public expenditure).
' The first prediction has been subjected to a detailed examination 
by Tobin and de Macedo (1980) and Branson and Buiter (1983), They find 
that this result is not robust to changes in model specification, e.g. 
introduction of wealth effects, deflating by a price index including 
the price of imports rather than the price of domestic goods alone, 
introducing an upward sloping aggregate supply curve so that the price 
of domestic output is related to the level of output, exchange rate 
expectations. On the other two predictions of the Mundell-Fleroing model 
these two sets of authors seem to concur.
The second prediction has not been scrutinized by itself. In the 
literature one can find models where expansionary fiscal policy is 
accompanied by depreciation. This occurs in models which assume 
purchasing-power parity and thus are not strictly comparable to the
' other models. -•
The third prediction is the one that concerns us in this paper.
Does increased government expenditure (financed by taxation) lead to 
an adjustment process with current account deficits?
It should be noted that the Mundell-Fleming model is a short-run 
model and hence the trade balance deficit is the impact effect of a
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fiscal expansion. Branson and Buiter, while taking issue with the 
first prediction of the Mundell-Fleming model, show that the third 
prediction carries over to a model with rational expectations. An 
expansionary fiscal policy is now accompanied by current account 
deficits until the new long-run equilibrium is reached with a lower 
stock of foreign assets. Other models, e.g. Sachs (1980), Marion (1982), 
Rodriguez (1979), which look at the long-run equilibrium of a Mundell- 
Fleming model, get similar results.
In this chapter we show that the Branson and Buiter generalisation 
of the Mundell-Fleming model is not the only possible one. While on 
impact the nominal exchange rate does appreciate, during the transition 
to the new long-run equilibrium the expanding country runs current 
account surpluses.
The reason for this is quite simple. One of the important lessons 
of the flexible exchange rate literature of the last ten years is the 
effect of the exchange rate on the valuation of foreign assets. Now, 
if the domestic economy was a creditor to the rest of the world to 
begin with, then in the new long-run equilibrium, following the fiscal 
expansion, we would have a lower domestic currency value of foreign 
assets if the new long-run value of the exchange rate is lower. If in 
the adjustment process the economy was running deficits then this 
process is further exacerbated, Thus the Branson-Buiter results require 
a strong negative wealth effect and/or a shift away from foreign assets 
in portfolios of domestic asset holders. While this is quite possible, 
it is by no means inevitable.
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model.
In Section 3, we look at the long-run solution of the model. Section 4 
analyses the short-run behaviour of the model when agents possess static 
expectations, while Section 5 looks at the short run with rational 
expectations. Section 6,offers some concluding comments.
2. THE MODEL
The model is a full employment, currency substitution version of the 
standard IS-LM model of the open economy. There are two assets, domestic 
money and foreign money. There are also two goods, one in the production 
of which the home country specialises, and another which is produced 
abroad. Domestic currency is assumed to be non-traded, so that trade 
balance (equal to the current account) imbalances must be financed by 
changes in the stock of foreign currency. The home country is assumed 
to be in a net creditor position vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
The model can thus be represented by the following equations :
(i) M/p » i(X, qy/p, W) ^  < 0 ¿2 > 0 0 < £3 < 1  .
A
(ii) qy/p » A[q(y-S)/p, W-W] + qG/p + T(A, ep*/q)
0 < A1 < 1 A2 > O , r£1 < 0 T 2 > 0 .
(iii) eF/p - T(A, ep*/q)
(iv) W 5 (M + eF) /p
A
(v) W = kqy/p
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(vi) S = G
(vii) y = y
f0 (a)
(viii) x = < •e_
e (b)
(ix) p = p(q, ep*)
where
M «» stock of domestic (outside) money
p = domestic price level (consumer price index)
e b the exchange rate, defined as the domestic currency price 
of foreign exchange
x * the expected rate of change of e 
q « the money price of domestic output 
y » level of domestic output 
W b real domestic wealth
A
W b  target level of wealth
S b lump sum taxes in units of domestic output
G * government expenditure in units of domestic output
P* * foreign currency price of the foreign good (taken to be 
exogenous)
F - stock of foreign money held by domestic residents (assumed 
to be positive)
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A dot over a variable denotes its derivative with respect to time, 
i.e. (z = dz/dt).
A variable z with a subscript i denotes a partial derivative 
with respect to its ith argument.
Equation (i) is the money market equilibrium condition. The real
supply of money must equal the demand for it. The demand for money
depends on the opportunity cost of holding money rather than the
alternative asset — foreign money, the transactions demand and on wealth.
This opportunity cost is given by the expected depreciation of the
domestic currency x • We take the transactions proxy to be the real
2/value of domestic output (qy/p) . Some authors prefer to use y  .but 
nothing crucial hinges on this assumption. Note that y  is fixed (at 
its full employment value) but gy/p is to vary. The final
argument in the demand for money function is real wealth. For later 
dérivation it would be convenient to write (i) as:
(ia) M/p « L(x, qy/pW)W 0 < (L2/L)(qy/pW) < 1
Equation (ii) is the goods market equilibrium condition. Equilibrium 
is attained when the real value of domestic output is equal t o  the demand 
for it. Demand arises from domestic consumers, the government and net 
exports abroad. Domestic consumption (on all goods) depends on disposable 
income and on the gap between actual and target wealth. This simplifies
3/
the long run solution of the model at no extra cost.- Strictly speaking, 
the relative price of foreign to domestic output also belongs as a 
determinant of total consumption, i.e, the decision about the level of 
consumption and its allocation between the domestic and foreign goods is
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simultaneous. Here we are following tradition in omitting the terms 
of trade from the A function. It is assumed that all the expenditure 
on goods and services by the government is on the domestic good and is 
denominated in units of that good. The trade balance depends on the 
total consumption expenditure by domestic residents and the relative 
price of the foreign output to domestic output. The Marshall—Lerner 
condition is assumed to hold at every instant, so that a rise in the 
relative price of the foreign good, ceteris paribus, improves our trade 
balance. Further, all capital gains are assumed to be saved. Capital 
gains arise from changes in the value of assets through inflation and 
exchange rate changes. This helps us to keep the dynamics of the system 
to two differential equations.
Equation (iii) states that the net acquisition of foreign currency 
(measured in units of domestic consumption) is equal to the trade balance.
Equation (iv) is the wealth identity. Real wealth of domestic 
residents is equal to the real value of domestic and foreign currency.
Equation (v) is the definition of target wealth, which is assumed to 
be a constant multiple, k , of the real value of domestic output.
Equation (vi) states that the government budget is always in balance.
Output (y) is always at the full employment level (y) according 
to equation (vii).
The expected rate of depreciation is either equal to the actual rate 
of depreciation when perfect foresight is assumed (equation viii(a)) 
(though this assumption does not hold when new information arrives) or 
equal to zero under static expectations (equation viii(b)) .
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Equation (ix) is the definition of the price index which is 
homogeneous of degree one in its two arguments.
We could reduce the dimensionality of the system by substituting (iv) 
to (ix) in (i) to (iii) to obtain the following:
M = L(x, qy/M+eF)(M+eF) (1 )
qy/p(q, ep*) = A
*
q(y-G)/p(q, ep*), (M+eF)/p(q, ep*) - kqy/p(q, ep*)
+ qG/p(q, ep*) + T(a, ep*/q) (2)
eF/p(q, ep*) - T(A, ep*/q) (3)
Before proceeding to analyse the behaviour of the model r two comments 
are in order. First, we have assumed that the alternative to holding 
domestic money is to hold foreign money. It is quite easy t o  introduce 
interest-bearing foreign asset. The major modification that this would 
require would be to introduce an interest service account. Also, we 
follow Branson and Buiter (1983) and Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) +in 
ignoring the real interest rate as a determinant of expenditure. This is 
done to reduce the order of the dynamic system from three to two 
differential equations.
Second, and more important, is that in our specification it is the 
level of output and not disposable income which determines target wealth 
If the latter variable were used we would still obtain similar results 
provided some further assumptions were made. In our defence we can say 
that an expansionary fiscal policy is accompanied by an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate. So even if we had used disposable income rather 
than y , the effect on desired wealth q(J-G)/p of such a  policy would 
still be ambiguous.
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3. LONG RUN SOLUTION
Without a loss of generality, we can assume that the long run equilibrium 
of the model is a stationary state, i.e. the actual and expected rates 
of growth of all nominal and real variables is zero.
We thus have 4 - F = 0 . Substituting these in equations (1) , (2) 
and (3) we can write the long run solution as
M - L(l/k)kqy (4)
M + eF = kqy ^
T[A(q(y-G)/p(g/ ep*)), ep*/q] - 0 (6)
(A tilde denotes the long run value of an endogenous variable.)
These three equations determine the values of q , e and F .
This system is recursive. For a given value of M (exogenously fixed) 
we can determine the value of q from (4) . Substituting for q  in (6 ) 
we can find the value of e . And, finally, from equation (5) we can 
determine F once we know q and e .
A tax-financed increase in government expenditure on domestic goods 
and services has no effect on the value of q because this fiscal 
expansion leaves the money market equilibrium condition unchanged in our 
model. So across steady states the value of q is fixed. Now, from 
equation (6), it is obvious that an appreciation of the exchange rate 
is required for the trade balance to be zero. An increase in G  , 
because it implies an increase in taxes, tends to improve the trade 
balance. Given the value of q , e must fall. This appreciation
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brings about a current account balance in two ways. First, it induces 
substitution away from home goods by both domestic and foreign residents. 
iAnd second, by lowering the price level and thus increasing the real 
value of disposable income, it induces more imports.
Finally, from equation (5), it is clear that eF must remain 
constant, so an appreciation of the currency would lead to an equal
a a** «•
percentage increase in the stock of foreign bonds, i.e. F = -e where 
a D  denotes percentage change. Thus across steady states, a fiscal 
expansion implies a higher stock of foreign bonds and an equal percentage 
appreciation of the exchange rate.
Two features of the long run equilibrium should be mentioned.
First, equations (5) and (6) imply that all the disposable income of
the domestic consumers is spent. Second, even if desired wealth was a
*
multiple of disposable income, it is not necessary that F would be 
negative. It would depend on, among other things, relative share in 
wealth of money and foreign assets, and on the extent of appreciation 
required to bring about balanced trade. 4
4. STATIC EXPECTATIONS .
If agents have static expectations then a momentary equilibrium is 
described by equations (1) and (2) with x =» 0 . These two equations 
(equations (7 ) and (8) below) determine the short-run values of e and 
q , given the value of F and the exogenous variables.
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M = L (qy/ (M+eF) ) (M+eF) (7)
q(y-G)/p = A q(y-G)/p, (M+eF)/p - kqy/p + T(A,ep*)/q ( 8 )
An increase in G creates an excess demand for domestic output.
A rise in the value of q eases the demand pressure in the goods market 
in three ways. First, it raises the real value of domestic output.
Second, it creates an expenditure switch towards foreign goods b y  
lowering ep*/q . And, finally, it lowers the value of domestic wealth 
and raises the value of desired wealth and thus encourages savings.
An appreciation of the exchange rate also tends to lower the demand for 
domestic goods. It does this by lowering the price level and thus 
increasing the real value of domestic output, by switching demand 
towards foreign goods, by lowering the real value of foreign money and 
raising desired wealth. But a fall in the price level also raises real 
balances. We assume that the net effect of an appreciation is to create 
an excess supply of goods.
In the new short run equilibrium, following an increase in government 
expenditure, we have an appreciation of the home currency and an increase 
in the price level. This is apparent from the money market equilibrium 
condition. An increase in either q or e creates excess demand for 
money. Since the nominal quantity of money is exogenous and P  is 
predetermined at any moment, we must have e and q moving in opposite 
directions. But a depreciation of e and a fall in q would add to 
the excess demand for output created by an increase in G . So e must 
fall and q rise.
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The dynamics of the system can be expressed in terms of equation (9) 
which is equation (3) rewritten emphasizing the dependence of e and q
An increase in F in (7) and (8) lowers both e and F . This seems
to suggest that ^  is ambiguous in sign. However, it can be proved
dF(see Appendix), after some tedious algebra, that ^  is negative if an
market for the foreign currency. The valuation effect of a depreciation 
of the real exchange rate outweighs the increased demand through the 
wealth effect and lower transactions demand for money channels. This 
must be so because a real depreciation leads to an excess demand for 
money, so there must be an excess supply of the other asset. So the 
system is dynamically stable under static expectations.
5. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
When agents possess perfect foresight a momentary equilibrium depends- 
on the entire (expected) time path of the economy from now to infinity 
It is, therefore, no longer possible to analyse the short-run equilibrium 
and dynamics separately.
Going back to equations (1) to (3), we can write the money market 
equilibrium condition as
on F .
(9)
appreciation of the real exchange rate creates an excess supply in the
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e/e » ij> (e,F,q) ^  > 0 > 0 > 0 . (10)
An increase in any one of e , F and q creates excess demand 
for money. This can be choked off by a rise in expected depreciation, 
given the stock of nominal balances.
The trade balance could be written as
F - 6 (e,F,q) > 0 &2 < 0 63 < 0 . (11)
Finally, the goods market equilibrium condition defines a 
relationship between q on the one hand and e and F on the other. 
An increase in either e or F creates excess demand in the goods 
market under the assumptions made in the last section. Thus q has to 
increase to restore equilibrium. Therefore we have
q - n (e,F) nx > 0 n2 > o . ( 12)
Substituting this in equations (10) and (11) and linearising around 
the long run equilibrium, we obtain
( e
F
ts
N f
all a 12 e - e
a 21 a 22 F - F. ,
all > 0 a 12 " 0
a 21 > 0 a 22 •= °
(13)
(A priori, the sign of a21 seems ambiguous, but in fact 
it is positive - see Appendix.)
The determinant of the matrix of coefficients in (13) is negative. So 
the long run equilibrium (F,e) is a saddle-point. This is portrayed 
in Figure 1.
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Unless the system happens to be on the stable arm, the economy never
gets to the long run equilibrium. We make the common, but arbitrary,
assumption that the system is always on the saddle path. This is ensured
by jumps in the exchange rate, the stock of foreign assets evolving
slowly over time. The implication of this assumption is that agents
possess long-run perfect foresight and somehow rule out the non-convergent
, 4/
myopic perfect foresight paths as inoptimal.
• The saddle path is flatter than the 4 = 0 locus. It must be
remembered that with static expectations the adjustment path of the 
economy is the e = 0 schedule.
The effect of an expansionary fiscal policy is portrayed in Figure 2.
Suppose the economy was in long-run equilibrium initially. Following 
a fiscal expansion the position of the new long-run equilibrium is E1 .
The new 4 = 0  locus is below and to the left of the old one. We know 
that this must be so from the fact that with static expectations the 
exchange rate appreciates in the short run. The impact effect of the 
tax financed fiscal expansion is to put the economy on the new stable 
manifold s ’s' at point E ^  . The nominal exchange rate thus undershoots 
its long run equilibrium value. Notice, however, that with rational 
expectations the jump appreciation is greater than with static expectations. 
As a general point, it is quite possible that with a real disturbance the 
jump in the exchange rate under rational expectations would be greater 
than with s ta t ic  expectations. Here, rational speculators take into 
account the long run appreciation of the exchange rate'(see Dornbusch and 
Fischer (1980)).
Following the jump, the exchange rate appreciates steadily to its 
long run value. This appreciation is accompanied by trade balance surpluses.
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The price of domestic output (q) rises when the expansionary
fiscal policy is put into effect (as is shown in the Appendix) . The
increase under rational expectations is less than with static expectations.
The moment the new policy is put into effect, the level of nominal wealth
falls, due to the appreciation of the domestic currency, and the desired
level of nominal wealth rises, as q rises. This gap must be big enough
to reverse the initial excess demand caused by the increased government
, 5/
spending, and for a current account surplus to emerge.—
This point needs to be emphasised. With rational expectations, a 
momentary equilibrium is that position which puts us on the unique 
convergent path to the new long-run equilibrium. If the new long-run 
equilibrium requires a higher stock of foreign currency, then e and q 
will take on values in the short run so that a current account surplus 
emerges.
•6 . CONCLUSIONS
In a full-employment portfolio balance macro model, we have shown that 
an expansion in government spending on domestic goods and services 
leads to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate (as predicted by 
the Mundell-Fleming model) and a current account surplus (contrary to 
the prediction of that model and others). This latter result follows 
from the appreciation of the home currency which, in the absence of 
current account surpluses, would lead to a fall in the real value of 
foreign bonds (in domestic consumption units),
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This result is possible in a model where the restrictive form of 
the target wealth function is absent. Whether a deficit or a surplus 
accompanies a fiscal expansion is, then, an empirical matter.
This result would carry over to a model with unemployment and 
sticky prices. Real wage rigidity could easily be introduced into the 
model by making y - y(ep*/q) with y' < 0 . None of the conclusions 
are modified thereby. Imported intermediate goods would further 
strengthen the result.
Interest-bearing foreign assets would make no difference to the 
result. Introduction of domestic nominal bonds which are perfect 
substitute for the foreign bond also does not change any of the results. 
The assumption of net creditor position of the home country is crucial 
to the analysis.
It was also shown that it is not necessarily true that with static 
expectations, the jump in the exchange rate when a previous unanticipated 
policy is implemented is greater than when agents possess rational 
expectations.
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a p p e n d i x
Static Expectations
dir ©To sign —  write the endogenous variables as / and q
e ,
It can be verified that-if a rise in / creates excess demand in 
the domestic money market (see p 14} then
. d%  < 0  3a < ola
dF
dF
Now the trade balance can be written as
T(q, */, F) > 0 T2 > 0 and Tj < 0
9Ffrom which —  < O . 9F
Rational Expectations^
The value of &21
[*LlA2M/e('(y-SU2Tl, + T3 ? ,] * 0
where
4 - - e W L ^ ^  t j a - V ^ V  - + R2ll+Tl'5el+ T2^*l > °
and e and are the elasticities of the price index with respect t.o
the price of domestic output and the price of importables respectively.
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The Dynamics in Terms of q and F
The goods market equilibrium condition (equation 2) gives us a 
relationship between e , q and F .
e = e (q, F) ex > 0 e2 < 0 . (Al)
Differentiating (Al) with respect to time and substituting
the expression in the money market equilibrium (equation 1) we get
q » Z(F, q, F) Zi > 0 Z2 > 0 Z3 > 0 • <A2)
Substituting (Al) in the trade balance we get
F * X(q, F) Xl > 0 X 2 < 0 . (A3)
Substituting this expression in equation (A2) we get
q “ V(q, F) ^  > 0 Vj = ? (A4)
But we know from our discussion on the impact effect of fiscal 
policy under static expectations that the price of domestic output rises. 
Therefore the q * 0 schedule must be downward sloping as in Figure 3.
E is the initial long-run equilibrium. E. the new long-run 
0 *'
equilibrium. The long-run value of q does not change. The momentary
equilibrium following the unanticipated fiscal expansion is at E ^  if
Ragents have static expectations and at EQl if they have perfect 
foresight.
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FOOTNOTES
1/ See, e.g., Dornbusch (1980), Chs. 10 and 11.
2/ E.g. Branson and Buiter (1983), Turnovsky (1981). Dornbusch 
and Fischer (1980) use national income. In our model the 
foreign asset is not interest-bearing and thus there is no 
interest income from abroad.
3/ On the issue of how wealth effects enter the expenditure 
equation, see Fischer (1981).
£/ In this appeal is usually made to the transversality conditions 
of optimising models, e.g. Brock (1974, 1975).
5/ A good example of this kind of result in a rational expectations 
model is the "undershooting" case in the Dornbusch (1976) model. 
There undershooting occurs when the rise in income caused by 
the depreciation, following an increase in money supply, raises 
the demand for money so much that the nominal interest rate has 
to rise to clear the money market.
CHAPTER IV
THE FOREIGN REAL INTEREST RATE AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
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1. Introduction
. In this chapter we look at the relationship between the foreign
real rate of interest and the real exchange rate. We first derive 
a semi-reduced form expression for the real exchange rate from an 
extended Mundell-Fleming model when agents have rational expectations. 
The exchange rate equation is then estimated.
The Mundell-Fleming model has been extended to take account of
secular inflation by a number of authors (see e.g., Buiter and
Miller (1 9 8 1),(1982),(1983) and Turnovsky (1981)). We extend this
model further to take account of wealth effects in the demand for
money and the consumption function. Through this channel the net
claims on the rest of the world (and therefore the current account)
influences the exchange rate. This study is an attempt to integrate
two sources of (intrinsic).exchange rate dynamics - the first arising
1from sticky prices and the second due to asset accumulation.
The model can be represented by three state variables - the real 
exchange rate, real money balances and the stock of foreign bonds,
Given the sufficient conditions (which are well known in the literature), 
there are two stable roots and one unstable root. We can derive 
a semi-reduced form expression for the real exchange rate following 
the methods of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Buiter (1984) (see also 
Mussa (1982)). The real exchange rate, a non-predetermined or jump 
variable, depends on the current values of the two predetermined 
variables and the expected future time paths of all exogenous variables.
In this study, we limit ourselves to the study of one exogenous 
variable only - the foreign real interest rate. The analysis could 
be extended to the study of more exogenous variables if more monthly 
data was available.
The expression for the real exchange rate involves an infinite 
"lead" in the future path of the exogenous variable. We simplify
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this expression by taking a Koyck transform. Two alternatives are 
investigated. The first, where the transform enables us to express 
the current real exchange rate in terms of current predetermined 
variables and lagged variables. The second method expresses the 
current value of the real exchange rate in terms of the current 
predetermined and exogenous variables and values of the state 
variables in the next period.
The model is then estimated, in turn, by ordinary least squares 
(OLS), non-linear least squares(NLS) and non-linear instrumental 
variables (NLIV). OLS ignores the non-linear restrictions on the 
parameters. NLS gives consistent estimates only when certain special 
conditions obtain.
The coefficients in the equations estimated turned out to be of 
the expected sign2 and "significant .
The results are encouraging especially since some previous efforts 
to implement empirical models of the exchange rates for the U.K. have 
yielded very poor results (see, e.g., Hacche and Townsend (1981)).3
In section 2 we outline the model and then we solve for the real 
exchange rate. In section 3 we estimate the real exchange rate 
equation. Finally, section 4 offers some comments on the results 
and the drawbacks of the model.
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2. THE MODEL
The model consists of the following equations:
M/P = L(i* + E (De/e),y,W) (1)
L. < 0, L > 0, 0 < L. < 1 1 ~ l * a 3 *
qy/P - A (qy/P + i*eF/P,i* + Et(De/e) - Et(DP/p),w) + T(A,y*, eP*/q)'
( 2)
0 = Al = 1 ' A2 = 0 ' A3 s 0 ' 0 s T l i 1 ' T 2 * O r T 3 > O
Dq/q - j(y-y) + E (De/e) + DP*/P* (3)
j’ > 0
eDF/P ■ T(A, y*,eP*/q) + i*eF/P (4)
W * (M + eF)/P (5)
P = P(q,eP*) (6)
i* ■ r* + DP*/P* (7)
where M is the nominal money supply, P the price index, i* the 
foreign nominal rate of interest, e the exchange rate (domestic 
currency price of foreign exchange), y (y*) the level of domestic 
(foreign) output, W, the real financial wealth, q, the domestic 
currency price of domestic output, F, the stock of foreign bonds,
P*, the price of foreign output in foreign currency, y, the "natural" 
level of output, and r*, the real foreign interest rate. D  denotes 
the time derivative (= dt)' and E is the expectations operator.
Equation (1) is the money market equilibrium condition. Real 
demand for money depends on the domestic nominal interest rate, 
domestic output and the level of real wealth. The domestic interest
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rate is equal to foreign nominal interest rate plus the expected 
rate of depreciation of the domestic currency i.e., uncovered interest 
parity holds. Since we impose rational expectations, expected and 
actual rates of change of a variable are always equal except when new 
information arrives.
Equation (2) is the goods market equilibrium condition. Demand 
for domestic output 'from domestic consumers depends on real national 
income, the expected domestic real rate of interest, real wealth and 
the terms of trade. Exports depend on foreign output (y*) and the 
terms of trade. Note, that all real variables are expressed in terms 
of the consumption basket i.e., deflated by the CPI.
Equation (3) is the expectations-augmented-Phillips' curve.
The value of q, which is predetermined at any instant, changes over 
time if the level of output is different from its natural rate and/or 
if the cost of the imported good is changing. This form can be 
derived from a mark-up pricing rate where money wage changes depend 
on the output gap and the change in the cost of living.^
... All bonds in the model are foreign currency, short bonds and 
domestic money is non-traded. Therefore foreign asset accumulation 
is equal to the current account surplus (equation (4)).
Real wealth is defined in equation (5) and is the real value of 
domestic money and the stock of foreign bonds. The domestic economy 
is assumed to be a net creditor country and so F is positive.5
Equation (6) is the definition of the price index. P is homog­
eneous of degree one and increasing in its arguments.
Finally equation (7) defines the foreign nominal interest rate 
as the sum of the foreign real rate and the foreign rate of inflation. 
The latter is assumed.to be contemporaneously observed.
Equations (1) to (7) represent an open economy IS-LM model with 
wealth effects and rational expectations. It can be reduced to a
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system of three differential equations. Defining the state variables 
as c = e/q, i = M/q, and F, and linearising the system we get
DC.” c
D£ SS A i
i__
_ F•»
+ BZ ( 8 )
where Z represents a vector of exogenous variables.
If the sufficient conditions in Appendix A are met, then the 
matrix A has two stable roots and one unstable root. We can 
"associate" the real exchange rate with the unstable root and derive 
a solution for it in terms of the other two state variables and the 
expected future time path of the exogenous variables following the 
method outlined by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Buiter (1984) .
This is done in equation (9) . The other two state variables are 
associated with stable roots and are backward looking.
C(t)
where X ■
i n * X 32 F -
*33 1 ” x 33
'x ll X 12 X 12
(S X 21 X 22 X 23
*31 X 32 X 33-
33
.00
exp X3(t-t).S.E ZCxJdT. (9)
and E is the expectation operation,
t being the date on which expectations are formed. The columns of x a
the (left) eigen-vectors associated with the three roots X , X and XX 2 3 '
being the unstable root.
The vector S is defined in equation (10)
3 3 . 3
S = (J X x3ibil' X3ibi2.....x3ibiJc>.' UO)
where b ^  is the (i,j)-th element of B.
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balances and reduces absorption. 6 is the "discount factor" and must 
be less than unity becaure in deriving equation (11) (or (9)) we have 
eliminated the unstable roots.
Equation (11) is a forward-looking expression - an infinite "lead" 
There are three methods used to estimate such an equation. The first 
method uses lagged values of the exogenous variable to predict future 
values of r *.6 The second method involves using actual values of 
the future variables and instruments 1 The third method reduces the 
infinite forward looking expression to a more manageable one by using 
a Koych transform.. I f  there are n exogenous variables then we have 
n-period ahead variables (rather than expressions from t to »). 
Alternatively, we could transform equation. (11) into one in which 
lagged variables rather than future variables appear (see Abel (1981),
Flavin (1981) and Bayashi (1982)).
In this study we have followed the third method. Since we have 
one exogenous variable (r*) we can have either a one period lead 
(Method A) or a one. period lag (Method B ) .
For the' estimation, monthly data from December 1971 to January 
1980 was used (see Appendix B for details) . Two dummies were used 
one for monetary targets (MMD) which was zero upto August 1976 and 
the other for exchange controls (ECD) which was zero upto August 1979.
m e t h o d  a
Shift equation (11) forward one period to get:
V + “lFt+l + V t + l  + “ 3 , L  ilE(< +l+t/ I t+ l> (12)'■'t+l W * “ --- —
Taking the expectation of equation (12) conditional on the information
available at t:
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TABLE 1
A. C ■ .0467  + . 9 7 9 C (aJ 
 ^ t+x -  .833F^a) + .832F„(a) + t+1 .388£^ a )
( 0 .2 1 )  (7 0 .1 3 ) ( - 1 4 .4 5 ) ( 1 4 .5 8 ) ( 4 . 2 2 )
-  .396£^a| + . 0 0 2 4 7 r * (b) + . 00043ECD -  -01512MMD(a)
( - 3 . 9 9 ) (1 .86 ) ( . 0 4 ) ( - 2 . 8 6 )
RSS » .0127 SE of Regression = .0120
R 2 = .997 R 2 = .996 F(8,87) - 3813
Log likelihood = 2 9 2 . 3  DW - 2.10
B . Parameter
constant 
6
“ 1
“ 2
a3
ECD
MMD
RSS
SE of Regression 
Log Likelihood
LM TEST
1st Order TR2 
12th Order TR2
Estimate NLS 
.0167(1.240) 
.991(198.97)(a) 
-.837(-14,69)(a) 
.391(4.29)(a) 
.00224(3.53)(a) 
.00546(0.78) 
-.133(-2.75)(a)
.0128
.0120
291.7
2.35
20.46
Estimate NLIV 
.0103 (0.48) 
.993(144.42)(a) 
-.761(-3.70)(a) 
.366(2.39) (a) 
.00225(3.19)(a) 
.00631(0.85) 
-.0X01(-1.16)
.0131
.0 1 2 1
6.07
25.87
In all cases 
observations
figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
was 96. The number
X2*1 (.10) ■ ™ 6,63 X12 (. 10.) " 26.22"
Additional Instruments for NLIV, F. ,, t , r* c v *
t- 1  t- 1  t-1 ' wt-l' yt-lf p t-
All variables other than r*, ECD and MMD are in logs.
(a) Significant at 95%
(b) Significant at 90%
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The signs of all the parameters of interest are correct and all 
(except the constant and ECD) are significant (r* at 10%).
OLS estimates are inefficient because they ignore the non-linear 
restrictions on the parameters. To remedy the inefficiency, we 
re-estimated equation (14) by NLS using estimates derived from OLS 
as starting values of parameters. The results are reported in Table 
IB.
All the parameter estimates are of the correct sign and are 
significant (at 5%). The value of 6 is high though less than unity. 
A Lagrange Multiplier test for first and twelfth order serial 
correlation (or moving average) found these to be absent (the test 
procedure is set out in Appendix C).
OLS and NLS give biased and inconsistent estimates of the para­
meters because (i) C ^  appears on the right hand side and (ii) the 
predetermined variables may not be free from realisation errors.
We therefore re-estimated equation (14) by NLIV, to get around this
errors in variables problem using instruments for C ,, F ,, ■ .
t+I t+1
The results are reported in Table IB.
The estimates are of the correct sign and significant, though 
the value of 6 is again very high.
We again did LM tests for first and twelfth order moving 
average or serial correlation. These tests are fairly complicated 
to implement (see Appendix C for details) but no evidence of serial 
correlation was found (at 90%).
METHOD B
Equation (11) lagged one period is
00
CL , » Ct + “ ,F. , + a , + a ' T 6iEfr* J r  \t-1 O 1 t-1 2 t-1 3 0.B(rt+i-l/It-l) (15)
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• Multiplying equation (15) by 1/6 and subtracting from equation (11) 
we get
^ U - 6'1) + í'1C t . 1 + c.jFt - «1 S'1T t . 1  + a2l
2 t
.•1 . .~ 1 *
“ 26 ¿t-l " “36 rt-l
+ a 3 I S ^ ^ t + i ^ t ^  ” E r^t+i//lt - l ^  + Uti=o (16)
The term in the square brackets in equation (16) represents 
revisions in expectations about the future time path of r*. This 
term is uncorrelated with all other terms on the right hand side of 
equation (16) (and can be treated as part of U ).
The OLS estimates are presented in Table 2A. The estimate of 
6 from the coefficient of is greater than unity but if we use 
the coefficients of and then we can recover a value for
6 less than unity. All the coefficients other than on the dummies 
and the constant are significant.
Next we imposed the non-linear restrictions and re-estimated 
equation (16) by NLS. All the coefficients of interest are of the 
correct sign and significant. The value of 6 is also less than 
unity. No serial correlation of either first or twelfth order was 
detected.
NLS estimates are consistent if (i) F^ _ and are contemporaneously 
observable and (ii) there was no error term in equation (XI) .
If there was an error term in (11) then we would get a first 
order moving average error process Ut ** 'et -'■ This would
be correlated with C ^  and Ft> We therefore re-estimated 
equation (16) using NLIV. Instruments were used for C _ , & and 
p and the results are reported in Table 2B.
118
«
TABLE 2
ct * -.161 + .998C^| - .825F,(a) + t .826F(a) + t-1 .450
(-0.70) (69.3) (-14.04) (13.84) (4.55)
- . 4 2 b £ ^  -■ -:00311r*{a) t-1 - .00090ECD + .00966MMD
(-4.47) (-2.27) (-0.10) (1.77)
RSS - .0134 SE of Regression ■ .0124
R2 = ,997 R 2 *■ .966 F (8,87) 3818.4
Log likelihood - 289.7 DW = 2.09
Parameter
constant
1/6
«1
<*2
“ 3
ECD
MMD
RSS
SE of Regression 
Log Likelihood
LM TEST
1st Order TR2 
12th Order TR2
Estimate NLS 
-.0061(-0.51) 
1.004(186.78)<a) 
-.824(-14,22) 
.429 (4.63)
. .00232(3.55)(a) 
-.00296(-0.45) 
.00889(1.75)(b)
.0135
.0123
289.47
1,94
17.51
Estimate NLIV 
-.0124(-0.56) 
1.005(159,43)(a) 
-.967 (-3.80) 
.415(2.32) 
.00236(3.27)(a) 
-.00294(-0.43) 
.0119(1.28)
.0138
,0124
2 .0 2
13,87
In all cases figures in parentheses are t-statistics. The number of 
observations for OLS and NLS estimation was 96 and for NLIV it was 95
* 1 1 . 0 5 )  * 3'84 X12 (.05) “ 21.03
Additional Instruments for NLIV/ '^t-2, "^t-2*
All variables other than r*. ECD and MMD are in logs .
(a) Significant at 95%
(b) Significant at 90%
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NLIV results are not very different from the NLS results. All 
coefficients of interest are of the correct sign and significant.
The value of <5 is less than unity though it is high.
We tested for the presence of moving average or serial corre­
lation of the first and twelfth order by an LM test. These were 
found to be absent (at 95%) .
To sum up the econometric results, the estimates were found to be 
similar across all estimation techniques. The values of o^, a2 and
a, are all of the correct sign and significant. The value of 6 
was found to be less than unity though very high.
.i ■ ' ■' : ■ ■ ■ ■ ' . ,
; ■ ■ ■ •■'i ( i- -v . : .
■ ; - . ' ■ ■ - "■ '■
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• 4. CONCLUSIONS
We first set up a theoretical model and obtained a semi-reduced 
form expression for the real exchange rate in terms of the other 
state variables and the expected time path of the foreign real 
interest rate from now to infinity, conditional on currently 
available information.
The empirical estimates were found to be of the right sign and 
significant. The results suggest significant forward-looking 
behaviour on the part of the agents.
The drawbacks of the analysis are fairly obvious. We have 
looked at only one exogenous variable, though this was, in part, due 
to data considerations.
For the empirical analysis, we obtained the value of i, by 
dividing nominal balance(£M3) by the price index (CPI).8 So strictly 
speaking it was not a predetermined variable.
In spite of these shortcomings the results are on the whole 
encouraging.
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.a p p e n d i x  a
The determinant of matrix A in equation (8) is
• + v * 5 (-TiA3hg " (1 + T1A l)i*gh(1 - L3)} + (1 - L3)h(1 + Ti)i*gF] (A . 1)
where A - g l ^ K l  - A ^ l  + )h/j ' + A j U  + T^a] (A 2)
and g = e/P , h ’= q/P and a is the share of the domestic good in the price 
index (i.e. a = P^q/P )•
The trace of A is equal to
■ - Ax(l + T1))h' - A1(l + T1)i*FgV- A3 (i + T )mh* - A (1 + T. ) Fg' - T P*}
+ g{(Lx - L2-/j.').{-A3(l + Tx)h) - (1 - L3)h((l - A^l +,T1))h/j' + A2a(l + 1^))}
+ Lj^h/j'iid - A1)i*g + TxA3g' + A2o(l + T1)i*g)}] (A
For A to have two stable roots (negative real parts) and one unstable root 
the following two conditions taken together are sufficient:
(i) Determinant of A be positive
(ii) Trace of A be negative.
The following three sufficient conditions ensure that these requirements are met:
(a) (1 - Ax (l + T^Jh/j' + A 2 (l + Tx)a < 0
(b) .|T A 3gF| > (1 - A x)i*gF
(c) L3 = 1 .
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Condition (a) states that an increase in output (y) should create excess 
supply in the goods market. Supply increases by hy in real terms and demand 
by A^(l + T ^ h y  + A 2 (l + T^Jaj'y . A ^ l  + T ^ h y  is the increase (in real 
terms) in demand for domestic output out of increased output. But an increase 
in output also increases the rate of inflation (for a given De/e ) and thereby 
lowers the real rate of interest by aj'y . This, in turn, increases expenditure 
on domestic goods and services by ^ ( l  + •
Condition (b) requires the interest service account to be "small", it is 
somewhat stronger than the condition usually encountered in the literature, 
namely that an increase in foreign assets should worsen the current account.
Finally, condition (c) requires wealth effects in the demand for money 
to be high. A higher value of m requires, ceteris paribus, a high Dm to 
clear the money market. If is high then the extent of excess supply due
to increased real balances is correspondingly lower and the tendency towards 
instability is also lower. In the fixed exchange rate literature, however, 
a high value of was seen to be "destabilising" (see e.g. Kingson and
Turnovsky [1978]).
APPENDIX B
1. The nominal exchange rate data is the trade-weighted effective exchange 
rate (EER) published in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (BEQB).
It is defined as the foreign currency price of domestic currency. In 
our analysis, the exchange rate is defined as the domestic currency price 
of foreign exchange.
2. The foreign nominal interest rate is a weighted average of short term 
interest rates of the UK's major trading partners. The weights are 
MERM weights. The data is a monthly average and is taken from BEQB.
3. The nominal money stock figures refer to EM3, These were taken from 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the IMF.
4. The foreign real income and price level figures are also from the IFS. 
MERM weights were used to construct the series.
5. The domestic price level (retail price index with Jan 1974 *.100) series 
was taken from the Monthly Digest of Statistics (MDS) published by the 
CSO.
6. The net claims on the rest of the world series was constructed by adding 
(subtracting) current account surpluses (deficits) from the net foreign 
asset position of the UK economy. The current account figures are from 
MDS. The net foreign asset position is published in the June issue of 
the BEQB (and is subject to major revisions).
- 123 -
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APPENDIX C
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test for Non-Linear Least Squares (NT-^)
We set out the procedure for Model B, the test for Model A  is 
analogous.
The estimated equation was :
where LX 3 X .t u-1
To test for serial correlation (or moving average - the L M  test does 
not distinguish between them) of order n, write
(C.l)
where y = 1/6
or more compactly
(1 - yL) (1 - l p . L ^ C  - a  ( l - y L H l - E  p . l S f .
i=l 1 r 1 i*l 1 r
a (1-yL) (1 - Z  p t, j A 
i=l 1
i i+ a.yL (1 - I  p. L  ) - a (1 - I p L ) ECD 
J i=l i=l.
a.(l - £ p L i )MMD 
i«l 1
n
- 3(1 - I p .) * e 
i® 1
where et is white noise
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Now take the derivatives of e with respect to all the parameters
(S, a 1 » 0t2 ' 0t3 * “4 ' a5 • y and successfully and evaluate at the
estimated values g etc and = O V i ) .  This gives us the set 
of regressors
(l-YL)Ft , (l-yL)£t , -yLr*t , L (ct - ¿jF,.- î2It - ¿3rj)
ECD, MMD and U ± i * l/**«fn* (C.2)
Finally, we regress u on the set of regressors above. Then 
2 Asy 2
TR >  x (n) where T is the number of observations used to estimate 
(C.l) and R is the explained variation in the regression of on the 
regressors in (C.2).
LM Test for Non-Linear Instrumental Variables (NLIV) estimatinn
For the reasons indicated in the text, C , F and £ would
t*"l t t
be correlated with the error term and thus give rise to inconsistent 
estimates. So we instrumented these variables (C 
were the additional instruments used).
t-2, Ct- 3 r F t - 2 r £t-2
To perform the LM test, first, we need to regress all the 
instrumented variables (i.e. C ^ ,  Ffc and y  on all the instruments 
and exogenous variables (Ft_J# 4 ^ ,  r*, ECD, MMD, F , £ c
A  ■ - A
and Ct_3) . Call the fitted values Cfc Ffc a n d ■£
A
Next, regress the residuals from NLIV i » 1,..,,n on all
the exogenous variables and the additional instruments. Call the fitted
126
values U ^ i =
Finally, replace the values of C , F , 1 . u i -* • t t  ^ ^
in (C.2) by the fitted values and regress on the set of regressors 
thus generated.
2 Asy 2Again TR % x (n) •
' - A ' " '
. v - v V ; ;
■
' • : ' ' ' ' -■■■ "
.
A ' A '
■ . . . . . ■ ■
.
i -  r ^ v V V - ' v '
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FOOTNOTES
1. Since the Munde11-Fleming model incorporates uncovered interest 
parity, analysing wealth accumulation (ignoring real capital) would 
involve looking at the current account deficit in the balance of 
payments and the budget deficit of the government. Since there is 
no reliable monthly data on government expenditure, taxes, etc., we 
have ignored the government budget constraint and, indeed, government 
bonds in what follows.
2. The expected sign of a parameter refers, in this context, to
the sign associated with the dynamic adjustment paths (the stable arms) 
of sticky price and asset accumulation models respectively.
3. Their study, which is the most comprehensive with UK data, comes to 
the following conclusion;
"... We have not succeeded in finding any empirical regularities 
in the data to help explain in any satisfactory way the funda­
mental determinants of sterling's effective exchange rate during 
the floating period." (p.243)
The performance of exchange rate models for other countries in pr e ­
dicting out-of-sample is very poor (see Meese and Rogoff (1983)). 
Frankel (1983) contains an excellent survey of the empirical imple­
mentation of exchange rate models. Hooper and Morton (1982) discuss 
some of the issues related to exchange market intervention in the 
context of a two-country model similar to ours. Their reduced form 
expression is very different from ours.
4. Write the wage-Phillips curve ass
Dv/v » k(y-y) + E DP/P (a)
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Now if the price of domestic output is a constant mark-up over 
wage costs then (a) becomes:
,Dq/q = k(y-y) + EfcDP/P.
Equation (3) follows from (b) if we substitute the definition of 
P (equation (6)), where j * k/(i-a) where a * . 3..
Note that in equation (3), q is a predetermined variable, even 
though e is a jump variable.
5. As mentioned in footnote (1) we have ignored domestic currency 
government bonds. This model would be consistent with the view 
that domestic bonds do not constitute net wealth. If government 
expenditure is constant and a constant growth rate of money is 
maintained with residual bond financing, we would get a model 
identical to the one above.
6. Abel and Mishkin (1983) contains a good discussion of these models.
7. See, e.g. McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982). Hansen and Sargent 
(1981) discuss the properties of instrumental variables estimators.
8. £M3 is an inappropriate monetary aggregate from a theoretical view­
point for this study, where the own return on money is zero. We 
tried the same regressions with Ml and the results were not dis­
similar to the ones reported.
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